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Article Summary: Initially the Burlington carefully chose immigrants likely to succeed as prairie farmers. When the number of immigrants increased and more railroads began selling farm land in later years, the Burlington found itself forced to concentrate on quantity rather than quality.

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Photographs / Images: George S Harris, broadside used by the Burlington in its British campaign for settlers

BETTER BRITONS FOR THE BURLINGTON:

A Study of the Selective Approach of the Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy in Great Britain, 1871-1875

By IAN MacPHERSON

The colonization railroads of the 1870's tended toward two extremes in their efforts to settle the rich lands of the American West: either they attempted to attract anyone who could pay the fare west, or they sought only those with sufficient capital or experience—and preferably both—to make settlement comparatively easy. Each extreme had its share of supporting and opposing arguments. Supporting the idea of unselected immigration was the obvious advantage of receiving an immediate, though perhaps partial, return on earlier investments. For railroads requiring money immediately—and there were many during the seventies—the lure of the quickly-returned investment was irresistible. By accepting this alternative, however, colonization railroads were courting future disaster. Untrained, poorly financed settlers almost inevitably encountered severe reverses during the first few years, and these reverses could mean prolonged hardships for the railroads. In contrast, the selective approach to colonization offered

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slow returns at first but promised future local stability, continuous profits, and enhanced reputation. Each colonization railroad had to choose between the two extremes or to form some type of compromise; the decision, once made and once implemented, determined the location, methods, and final effects of each company's colonization endeavours.

In 1869 when it began large-scale colonization work in Iowa and Nebraska, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad decided in favor of the selective approach.¹ In part, this decision was reached because the ambitious, shrewd Bostonians controlling the company favored conservative, calculated methods of operation.² More importantly, the decision was made because of the predilections of George S. Harris, the man hired in 1869 to head the company's Iowa and Nebraska Land Department. Harris came to the company from Missouri where he had successfully led the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad's Land Department for the preceding six years.³ Basic to his successful Missouri labors had been his consistent effort to secure only experienced, relatively rich farmers for the company's lands. In organizing his promotion campaigns, for example, he had avoided advertising extensively in the large ports of the Atlantic Seaboard mainly because most European immigrants were not farmers. Instead, he had concentrated his department's activities upon the agricultural regions of the United States. He had emphasized the agricultural possibilities of Missouri and had searched for experienced, easily assimilated farmers. By 1869 these policies had reaped a good harvest for Harris, and he was probably the best known land commissioner in the United States. In view of this earlier success, Harris naturally favored the adoption in Iowa and Nebraska of the same selective approach he had used so successfully in Missouri.

Shortly after his arrival in Iowa and Nebraska, Harris applied this approach in his policies on land prices and assistance to colonists.⁴ He insisted upon charging a reasonable price for the land he sold, thereby giving the Burlington some immediate return on its investments, and in-

cidentally, virtually excluding paupers. He also offered inducements to richer colonists by allowing a twenty per cent discount on all lands paid for immediately. To help prospective colonists make a good choice of lands, Harris strongly advocated a trip west before any purchase was made. For those who took his advice, the company provided free accommodations in Immigrant Homes located in Lincoln and Burlington. To make such a trip even more attractive, Harris had the company grant to each settler who purchased land a credit equal to the cost of his ticket on the Burlington Route. As a final inducement to well-prepared colonists, Harris adopted the policy of allowing large reductions in the cost of shipping machinery west.

The clearest proof of Harris's adherence to the selective approach, however, is found in his methods of publicizing the Burlington's Iowa and Nebraska lands. To sell the nearly three million acres he had at his disposal in the two states, Harris turned to the American East where he had found so many settlers for the Hannibal and St. Joseph. As in Missouri, he relied upon select newspapers to carry his message, upon carefully screened agents to stimulate interest, and upon rural states to provide the best settlers. He even undertook to search for people with the proper religious background. He believed that the colonization business was "a good missionary work",⁵ and he hired a number of ministers to search the American East, especially for "good old puritan New England stock. . . ."⁶

He was forced, however, to settle for lesser breeds. The American East was no longer the colonization agent's paradise. When Harris had worked for the Hannibal and St. Joseph, there were only a few states and only a few railroads working at colonization; by 1870, at least twenty-six states were actively pursuing settlers in the great ports and throughout the countryside. Countless railroad companies and numerous private societies were seconding the work of official agencies and viciously undercutting the work of rivals.⁷ Harris soon recognized the power of the competition and saw that the company was not securing

the type of settler desired. He decided, therefore, to enlarge the company's foreign activities in British North America, and especially in Europe.

Harris's decision to concentrate upon farmers in foreign countries was hardly an innovation. After the Illinois Central had pioneered in European agencies during the fifties, many other railroads, including the various Burlington companies, had investigated the possibility of European agencies. The Burlington's Iowa and Nebraska Land Department had contemplated European agencies in 1868,⁸ and Harris had employed some agents there while in Missouri.⁹ At the same time state governments had become interested in employing foreign colonization agents, and Iowa politicians were particularly interested because their state was attracting only a comparatively few settlers.¹⁰ In 1870, therefore, the Burlington was not undertaking a wild, new scheme when it joined forces with the Iowa government and another Iowa land grant railroad, the Rock Island, to sponsor three agents in Germany, Holland, and Great Britain.

The success of these three agents varied considerably. The man assigned to Germany never left New York because of the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. The Dutch agent reached his destination and carried out his assignments but did not attract many settlers, probably because farming was more prosperous in Holland than anywhere else in Europe.¹¹ The British agent, Edward Edginton, was the only one to encounter extensive success. He exhausted his supply of pamphlets rapidly, attended numerous meetings, and generally publicized the good farm lands available in Iowa and Nebraska. He wrote glowing accounts of his work to the Iowa authorities, describing, for example, how one advertisement in a religious newspaper had attracted over five hundred inquiries. The apparent value of such a reception was not lost upon the officials in Iowa; it was particularly appreciated by Harris who was very concerned over the lack of suitable colonists in the American East.

There were a number of major reasons why Great

Britain was an ideal focus for the Burlington's foreign colonization endeavours. As Harris had found out while in Missouri, British immigrants, possessing some agricultural training, adjusted most easily to life on the plains. They spoke the same language, had followed a similar legal system, and could be easily assimilated into American life. They were already interested in the United States and, generally, knew much about the country. Articles, books, and, most important of all, letters about the United States, were commonly and avidly read throughout the Kingdom.¹² Great Britain, moreover, was the center of the world at this time, and the British ports were ideal centers for reaching the hundreds of thousands who were migrating from the Continent in the seventies.¹³ From cities such as London and Liverpool, men could be readily sent to Scandinavia, Germany, and Holland to entice the best European farmers.

The real object of Harris's interest overseas, however, was the experienced, relatively prosperous, British farmer. The only way to reach this individual was to go to Great Britain. Most of the British immigrants arriving at the great North American ports of Quebec, New York, Baltimore, and New Orleans, were refugees from the poverty of either the rural or urban centers of Great Britain.¹⁴ Many of them were sponsored by various groups who were anxious to remove paupers before they became a serious drain upon the Poor Law system. Still others were able to cross the Atlantic because they used donations sent back by family members who had emigrated earlier. In 1870 over seven hundred thousand pounds were sent back to poorer British relatives by Americans, and almost half that amount was returned in the form of paid steamship passages.¹⁵ These emigrants, who obviously had little capital and possibly no agricultural experience, were not the type of settler the Burlington usually wanted. The company, therefore, had to go to Great Britain to stimulate, and to capture, the ideal type of immigrant it desired.

Late in 1870 Harris made the decision to open a more satisfactory British operation. Edginton had been generally

successful but had been overwhelmed by the sheer immensity of his task. In the early 1870's there were hundreds of thousands of immigrants in the British Isles, representing diverse backgrounds, migrating for numerous reasons and leaving at least a dozen ports. Edginton's methods consisted of a haphazard tour through the centers which seemed to be important.¹⁶ In doing so he could reach only a few of the immigrants and could not take the necessary time to attract the type of settler the Burlington desired. Nor could Edginton be certain that the colonists he did motivate would be able to ignore the convincing arguments of other land-sellers when they arrived in the New World.¹⁷ Harris decided, therefore, to send two men to develop a more organized agency. The men he selected, Cornelius Schaller and Henry Wilson, were native Britons who had migrated earlier, and who were experienced in promoting western settlement. Schaller, apparently ranking the higher of the two men, was designated the general superintendent of all European operations. Wilson was responsible for managing the largest British office in Liverpool and reporting on all expenditures.¹⁸ Together, the two men were to develop an integrated organization which would attract settlers, organize immigration, and supervise departures according to the company's selective approach. During the early spring of 1871, they arrived in Great Britain and were ready to commence their great adventure.

What was the nature of the market in which Schaller and Wilson opened their agency? Superficially, the prospects did not seem too encouraging. A traveller through the British countryside in 1871 probably would have been impressed with the prosperity of the Kingdom's farmers. After a century of agonizing reform, the enclosure movement had drawn to a close in 1840, and by 1870 the country's agriculturalists were reaping the harvests permitted by larger, more scientifically exploited fields. The same workers were also adopting the advanced methods developed by agricultural societies and state operated agricultural schools during the fifties. Nor could the traveller see any


shortages of markets. On the margins of coal fields stood the growing cities which marked the rise of Industrial Britain. Thus, the traveller could have asked, "Why would anyone leave the fields of grain or the fat, contented, cattle which represented the wealth of the satisfied British farmer?" "Why would they undertake an ocean journey which could be unpleasant, and why would they endure the hardships which even the best technology could not remove from railroad travel?" "Why would they choose the often lonely, arduous life endemic to newly settled regions?" "Why would they trade security for only a promise of future wealth?"

The answers to these questions were implicit in the declining nature of the British economy during the 1870's. During the preceding decade Great Britain had reached the zenith of her economic power. Her industry had undoubtedly been the best in the world, and her agriculture had been reputedly the most scientific. Commencing in 1869, however, Britain entered into a recession which was to last generally until 1896.¹⁹ During this recession, increased industrial competition from Germany and the United States and a lack of purchasing power among the Britons at home placed the industrial regions of Great Britain in a steadily declining condition.²⁰ The farmers were even more seriously affected. In former times they had been able to overcome the standard problems of cumbersome land holding methods, powerful foreign competition, high taxes, and limited territory by taking advantage of increasingly available capital, steadily improving farming methods, and constantly lowering transportation costs.²¹ Commencing in approximately 1870, however, the usual methods of the British farmer gradually failed him because of changing circumstances. With the slow retrenchment of British industry occurred a corresponding shortage of capital. With the gradual completion of the enclosure system the healthy expansionism of the preceding century reached its end, and the need for more laborers virtually ceased. With the slowly diminishing returns caused by the

general stagnation of agriculture, British farmers generally were unable to vary their crops sufficiently; hence their land was slowly sapped of its ancient strength. And finally, with the amazing revolutions in transportation on both land and sea, British farmers were confronted with overwhelming competition from foreign producers.

A brutal transformation of British agriculture might have permitted most farmers to regain their old position rapidly. The excess of capital, generally gathered during the sixties, however, permitted the nation to purchase its food overseas and to forego the agony of introducing drastic changes in agricultural areas. The transformation from grain growing to market gardening and animal husbandry, therefore, was gradual, and among many farmers relatively painless.²² Among farmers without much security, however, the adjustment was most difficult. Tenant farmers, living on lands with fixed mortgages and limited acreage, were in a particularly difficult position when grain prices began to fall during the late sixties and early seventies.²³ Similarly, farmers accustomed to high prices for small crops were forced to leave their farms, or to enter into usually unsatisfactory arrangements with more prosperous neighboring farmers. In an even more unsatisfactory plight was the farm laborer.²⁴ Not only did he have to contend with his employer's decreasing ability to pay, but he also had to face the competition of farm machinery and the small demands of constantly more common pastoralism. With increasing frequency they, along with members of the preceding two groups, deserted the sinking British agricultural industry and traveled to new lands overseas.

These British farmers were particularly interested in the American West. Many of them were wheat farmers and were impressed by the low costs which were involved in the production of American wheat. By 1870 wheat from states such as Nebraska was being sold in Liverpool at a lower price than locally-grown wheat. The reasons were not difficult to find.²⁵ A British farmer had to pay

George S. Harris

fifteen shillings an acre for taxes, in many instances a tithe, an income tax equal to one-half his rent, and a number of local taxes. In contrast the American western farmer had no tithe, no national tax, and low local taxes. British land was overused, moreover, and adequate manuring cost more than five times the amount of money that was required to ship an acre of wheat from Chicago to Liverpool. Such low costs made farming in Nebraska, seen from afar, seem very profitable to many British farmers; for this reason, the Burlington's British agents had a receptive audience.

Henry Wilson and Cornelius Schaller started to organize the Burlington's British agency in early March, 1871. Organizing the agency was a difficult project and required all the resources of both men for the remainder of the year.²⁶ The first major task was to appoint representatives throughout the United Kingdom. Wilson and Schaller eventually decided to separate their employees into two types, district agents and sub-agents. The district agents, who were paid on a part-expenses, part-commission

basis, were located in the major towns and shared some responsibility for the supervision of sub-agents.²⁷ As far as known, all the agents who were appointed in 1871 were brought over from the United States or were Americans living in Great Britain and working in the colonization business. A typical agent was William H. Hayward, who became the Burlington's main representative in London. Hayward had lived in the American West and in 1871 was a colonization agent for the state of Nebraska.²⁸ He was hired by the company in November, and he became a reliable and useful district agent. Other leading agents employed in 1871 were located in Manchester (S. J. Abington), Birmingham (C. S. Dawson), Glasgow (J. Fullerton),²⁹ and Hull (the Rev. Frederick Wheeler).³⁰ The agents used these towns as main bases for their work among the sub-agents and farmers located in the nearby rural areas.³¹

The sub-agents were scattered throughout the United Kingdom with most of them being located in the agricultural districts of such counties as Lancashire, Lincolnshire, Devonshire, Norfolk, Yorkshire, and Somerset. In general, Schaller, because of his greater authority and greater mobility, appointed most of the sub-agents. By the end of 1871, a conservative estimate would place the number of sub-agents at one hundred and fifty.³² Ordinarily they were steamship company representatives, newspaper editors, general merchants, or part-time farmers, and they were paid on a commission basis. Because the Burlington's British organization became a booking agency for numerous shipping lines and many American railroads, Wilson and Schaller were able to offer their sub-agents a commission on all the railway and steamship fares they sold. The sub-agents were allowed five per cent commission on all emigrants booked through the Burlington's district agents. They were allowed a further one per cent on all emigrants booked directly to Iowa or Nebraska.³³

To assist the agents and sub-agents in attracting settlers, Wilson and Schaller developed an extensive and varied advertising campaign. A major part of this campaign was

the distribution of circulars and pamphlets through the agricultural counties. In general, circulars were used to establish the amount of emigration interest in a given locality. If sufficient interest was demonstrated by individuals or by groups, the company then distributed pamphlets containing more information about Iowa and Nebraska. All circulars and pamphlets were distributed carefully, however, especially by Wilson, who ordered his men to give literally only "to Farmers, not to strollers, and [to] be careful not to give them to people not likely to emigrate".³⁴

The British agency simultaneously made use of the advertising pages of numerous newspapers. Wilson and Schaller expended considerable effort in selecting the newspapers so as to find the ones best suited to aid their agents and sub-agents.³⁵ Selection was extremely difficult because the British newspaper business was expanding rapidly during the seventies. Improved technology and lowered postal rates had made the publication and distribution of newspapers inexpensive by 1870 and had stimulated the establishment of journals in nearly every town, village, and coach-stop. Nevertheless, by the end of 1871, Wilson and Schaller managed to select one hundred and fifty newspapers, most of them located in the farming regions.³⁶ The few periodicals chosen from the major cities were usually religious or agricultural in orientation and had a decided impact upon surrounding rural areas.³⁷

The advertisements placed in the British newspapers were usually very short. They ordinarily contained a picture or a brief excerpt from a letter written by a successful settler in Nebraska and requested the reader to seek further information from the local company representatives. While Wilson and Schaller customarily drew up the advertisements themselves, agents and sub-agents could prepare their own so long as they followed company policy. In particular, they had to keep their advertisements attuned to the company's selective approach. All advertisements were to be directed toward farmers or toward people with

money and were not to offer false hopes to untrained, impoverished laborers.³⁸

The British agency also tried to publicize Iowa and Nebraska at the agricultural fairs which were common in Great Britain during the 1870's. Wilson and Schaller had exhibits of United States products sent across the Atlantic and taken to many of the fairs. Speakers accompanied the exhibits and used them as background for talks about the Burlington's lands. Circulars were distributed at the same time as the talks were given, and pamphlets were handed out to the more likely prospects. Schaller was particularly impressed with the use of fairs as a means of reaching the best types of settlers and often accompanied the exhibits as the key speaker. Indeed, during the autumn of 1871 he seldom did anything else.

Schaller was apparently a capable speaker and also spoke at various kinds of gatherings unconnected with agricultural fairs. But he was not the only orator hired by the Burlington for speaking tours in Great Britain. Some other speakers such as Edward Abington and C. S. Dawson were old employees of the company, brought over the Atlantic to serve as district agents, colony guides, and speakers. Dawson, in particular, seems to have been a very successful orator, partly because he used eighty-five large, vivid paintings as window-dressing for his presentations.³⁹ These paintings, each covering some two hundred square feet, were organized into a unit called the "Grand Silphorama of the Overland Route to California; by sea, river and rail, across the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, over the boundless prairies of the Great West, the Rocky Mountains, Utah Territory etc. . . ." ⁴⁰ Dawson presented his extravaganza to the accompaniment of "appropriate incidental music," and subtly included allusions to the prosperous lands of Iowa and Nebraska.⁴¹

Another type of speaker employed by the company in Great Britain was the successful, vacationing settler. Many of the speakers of this type were also ministers who wanted at least a temporary escape from the West or an

opportunity to lead a flock westward. From the company's viewpoint these ministers were apparently excellent representatives. They often had access to the very best social circles, a characteristic relatively uncommon among immigrants, and they were usually trustworthy. Coming from the cash-poor states of Iowa and Nebraska, they were also often in need of the two per cent commission on land sales offered by the Burlington. Just as important, many ministers saw in the colonization movement a definite Christian objective. One of their number, Frederick Wheeler, a minister in the Congregational Church, summed up this mingling of religion and emigration in his letter of application to George S. Harris.

The occupation of that vast area [Nebraska] for Christ is worth the attention of the patriot as well as the Christian. I am an Englishman by birth and education, having been in this country some sixteen years. I am about to return on a visit for a few months and I should enjoy, during my stay there, nothing so much as preaching a crusade for Nebraska, having no doubt but what I could bring back two or three hundred families.⁴²

Wheeler was hired, in part because Harris had a religious orientation toward the colonization work.⁴³ The same orientation probably influenced Harris's hiring for the British agency of another minister, Dr. Alexander King. Early in May, 1871, King started to write the Burlington Land Commissioner, claiming a deep interest in colonization, and even seeing in it "a burden of the Lord. . ."⁴⁴ A few months later, King arrived in Nebraska and began to lobby for a job as a colonization agent.⁴⁵ He showed Harris some articles he had written, and Harris was sufficiently impressed to offer King a tentative position. The appointment was contingent on financial assistance from the state government and on the approval of the president of the railroad. King immediately went to New York and, without waiting for Harris's confirmation that the two contingencies had been successfully resolved, left for Great Britain.

Once in Great Britain, King apparently set about his

work in earnest and sent back glowing reports of his labor. Harris, of course, was astonished that King was in Great Britain and that he was working for the company. Harris was impressed, however, with King's work and decided to support him, even though the state government would not provide financial aid. In November, 1871, Harris agreed to pay King two hundred dollars for his services from the first of October, 1871, to the end of March, 1872. King was also allowed fifty dollars per month for expenses and was permitted to devise his own schedule, co-operating with the Schaller-Wilson agency only so far as it was convenient.⁴⁶

King was primarily a lecturer who enjoyed meeting people from the middle and upper classes. He particularly wanted to activate an interest in colonization among "members of Parliament, capitalists, and public city men."⁴⁷ To work among this class of people required far more capital than he had been given, and, almost immediately, King started to petition for more money. Harris might have been more amenable to King's pleas if King had demonstrated an ability to control funds well. But King did not even display this simple, essential quality, for early in 1872 Harris had to chastise him severely for failing to provide itemized lists of monthly expenditures.⁴⁸

King's ability to account satisfactorily for his expenditures was only one of the problems to appear in the English agency during 1872. The separation of power between Schaller and Wilson had never been particularly well defined and certainly left Schaller in a difficult position. When Schaller had been given the general superintendence of all European agents in 1871, expansion to the Continent had been a distant possibility. Various experiments with the continental representatives in 1871 and 1872 failed, however, primarily because of the official opposition from national governments and chauvinistic aristocrats. Schaller was left, therefore, with only the general supervision of the English agents. But once agents were appointed effective regulation of them was assumed by Wilson, who

was in charge of the agency's finances and in charge of liaison with the shipping companies. Wilson, moreover, was in command of the agency's largest office in Liverpool and conducted the most important correspondence with sub-agents. Wilson, not Schaller, advised the sub-agents how to attract settlers, which newspapers to use, and which steamship lines to employ. In contrast, Schaller's job, by late 1871, consisted primarily of traveling throughout Great Britain, speaking at fairs, addressing various bodies, attending lectures by company speakers, occasionally appointing a new sub-agent, and infrequently calling at the Liverpool office. Stated simply, Schaller had the title and Wilson the power; in this split authority were the seeds of serious problems for the British agency.

Responsibility for the problems in the command structure of the British agency must ultimately be assigned to George Harris. When Harris devised the structure in 1870, he was probably influenced by two understandable, but damaging, misconceptions. In the first place he probably believed that a division of authority was necessary because of the immensity of the task revealed by Edginton's work. He was correct in seeing that the task was large, but he was wrong in believing that a division of responsibility would make the work easier. In fact, this division made the task more complicated by placing the two leaders in a situation where friction was inevitable. A minor example of the type of conflict this separation of power could cause was shown soon after the two men arrived. Wilson had appointed an agent in Bournemouth, only to find that Schaller had earlier, and unknown to him, appointed another local citizen. When he heard of Schaller's earlier appointment, Wilson most unhappily revoked the appointment of his man.⁴⁹ This minor incident only foreshadowed a later more serious difficulty which was partly created by the lack of unity between the two men.

Another misconception under which Harris labored was his belief that he could closely superintend the British agency. Quite understandably, Harris tended to regard

the British agency as essentially the same type of organization as the Burlington agencies in the eastern United States. The task was simply a matter of distributing literature, answering questions, and arranging transportation. Harris underestimated, of course, the complexity of establishing rapport with British citizens, the communications difficulties caused by the ocean, the increased international competition, and the problems associated with transportation arrangements. Nevertheless, Harris attempted to supervise the English agency, even to the point of reprimanding Wilson for spending six cents more than he needed to spend. The end result of Harris's attempt to run the agency and of the Wilson-Schaller split was that no one really had complete authority on a daily basis.

One of the reasons why Schaller found his sphere of operation limited was Wilson's above-average ability. Until early 1872 Wilson managed the Liverpool office efficiently, despite the complex problems involved in controlling agents and sub-agents and in advising and assisting emigrants. The agents were usually old company employees or experienced workers in the colonization business, so they needed only minimal direction. The sub-agents, however, were often new to the colonization business, were usually not located near the Liverpool office, and were always in need of supervision. Sub-agents were also employed on a commission basis, and had to be continually reminded that the company was interested in only certain types of immigrants. Indeed, the writing of these reminders became one of Wilson's most common and, perhaps, most boring tasks. At the same time Wilson also had to arbitrate between sub-agents over rival claims for commissions and to restrict sub-agents to the territories assigned to them. All of these problems required time and could be very vexatious.

Ordinarily, Wilson treated his sub-agents very civilly, and his letters, like those of Harris, were extremely polite and carefully worded. Whenever an agent made an error, however, Wilson was outspoken and uncompromising. In

July, 1871, for example, one of his agents, named Hillard, "allowed a passenger to slip through his hands" because of a misunderstanding over down payments.⁵⁰ Wilson wrote a very pointed letter, asking why Hillard had not sent a telegram of enquiry, and closing with the acid observation, "It is certainly very stupid of you to act as you did."⁵¹

As if the complex task of controlling sub-agents was not enough work, the Liverpool office under Wilson undertook a number of services to assist and to impress intending immigrants. Wilson, for example, was a booking agent for nearly all the major shipping lines operating out of Liverpool. Initially, he was on particularly good terms with the Cunard and Allen Lines, and arranged passages to all major ports in North America. Wilson also sold or arranged for tickets on all major American railroads, especially those linking the great ports with the Burlington's eastern terminals. Wilson really undertook these extra services, of course, as a means of insuring the safe arrival in Iowa and Nebraska of the settlers attracted by the British agency. If a man purchased all his transportation fares from him, then Wilson could be reasonably certain that he would not be sidetracked by the hawkers hired by competitors.

Protecting colonists from sinister Burlington competitors really began in Liverpool, where Wilson, in 1871 at least, served as "den mother" for immigrants immediately prior to their sailing. In order to provide a central meeting place and, more important, to help the innocent fend off the wily "runners" of Liverpool, Wilson tried to have them all stay at the same inn. The inn was operated by a Mr. F. McName, and there is no evidence that Wilson ever received money for his pains. Nevertheless, during 1871 Wilson remained faithful to McName by advising the innkeeper of arrivals, ordering his sub-agents to recommend the inn, and chastising them when they did not. In 1872 Wilson stopped utilizing McName's or any other specific inn, perhaps because it was too complicated, or perhaps

because of the gradual increase in the use of colonies.

The Burlington experimented with its first British colony in August, 1871, and when the experiment proved successful tended to use colonies more and more exclusively.⁵² The Liverpool office had control over these colonies, a power of particular importance during late 1871 when colonies briefly became the company's preferred method of migrating. Wilson recommended colonies to nearly all the intending immigrants he wrote and made arrangements for all colonies. These arrangements included the circulation of all advertising, the supervision of the guides accompanying the colonies, the arrangement of transportation across and on both sides of the Atlantic, and, often the initial negotiations for the purchase of land in Iowa and Nebraska. From a company viewpoint the expense involved in these arrangements seemed a sound investment because colonies were apparently captured flocks of ideal settlers banded together by national, religious, or economic bonds. Even more important, a colony shepherded by a guide could theoretically be kept isolated from the wily, scurrilous rogues working for competitors.

With the development of the colony method, the system virtually devised and ruled by Wilson was complete. If conditions prevalent in 1871 had remained constant, then Wilson's system would probably have prospered for an indefinite period. Unfortunately for him, however, Wilson made some unwise decisions which ultimately cost him his job. In part, these decisions resulted from his over-extension of the company's selective approach. Wilson had employed the selective approach when he had appointed agents in selected regions, chosen newspapers according to areas of impact, organized delegations for agricultural fairs, attempted to use a specific Liverpool inn, and employed the colony method of emigrating. Implied in these policies was a definite company interest in the welfare of the settler, an interest which Wilson perhaps developed because of Harris's earlier policies on immigrant houses and settlement aids. The problem was that Wilson took this pro-

tective attitude one step further, and in an effort to secure a safe, cheap passage westward for his immigrants, nearly sacrificed the British agency.

The source of Wilson's problems was the overwhelming power of the shipping lines in the port of Liverpool. When he had first arrived, Wilson had been on good terms with all the major shipping lines and during the first few months had distributed his passengers equally among them. He became an agent for most of the Liverpool lines, and by the autumn of 1871 could guarantee passage to his immigrants on any day of the week. By early 1872, however, Wilson was an expert on steamship lines and was carefully comparing the merits of each company. He soon decided that Cunard was "simply working on its reputation"⁵³ and that the White Star and Allen Lines were "undoubtedly the best lines running out of Liverpool".⁵⁴ He reported his findings to his sub-agents and advised them to stop booking passengers on Cunard's. When the Cunard Liverpool managers heard of this advice, they ordered Wilson and his sub-agents to return all their ticket-books. Wilson at first refused to do so, probably because Cunard was the best known steamship line, and because many immigrants preferred to sail on Cunard ships. Nevertheless, he eventually had no alternative, and ceased to be a Cunard representative early in 1872.⁵⁵

How accurate was Wilson's estimation of the comparative merits of the steamship lines? E. L. Babcock, the company historian of the Cunard Line, regarded the late sixties and early seventies as one of the darker periods in the history of the blue funnel ships. Samuel Cunard was dead; older, conservative leaders dominated the executive; and the Cunard sons were young, uncertain, and inexperienced.⁵⁶ In contrast, the executives of many Cunard competitors were aggressive, imaginative, and prosperous. The other lines were surging ahead by employing numerous new technological innovations and by constructing mammoth new liners. The White Star Line in particular was constructing sleek new vessels capable of greater speed

and larger cargoes. In contrast, the Cunard Line was complacently relying on the ships which had won it oceanic supremacy during the early sixties; in the highly competitive world of the shipping interests, such resting on ancient oars was a dangerous, perhaps disastrous, tendency. Thus Wilson was incisively accurate when he took the measure of the various lines in 1871.

Wilson's and the Burlington's problems with the shipping companies only began with the Cunard episode. The real difficulty commenced when Wilson tried to secure the cheapest, best route for his select groups of colonists. Wilson satisfied himself that the best railroad route from a major American seaport to Chicago was on the Baltimore and Ohio's line out of Baltimore. He also established that the Allen Lines linking Baltimore and Liverpool was an excellent steamship company, only slightly inferior to the White Star Line, the acknowledged leader. Using these judgements, Wilson then developed an attractive package plan for his colonists. He had excellent relations with the British railways, and became an agent for many of them so as to take complete advantage of all special reductions. He established a close connection with the Allen Lines so as to provide competent, complete trans-oceanic service for his colonists. He became a ticket agent for the Baltimore and Ohio to utilize all that company's special tariffs on westward traffic, and, of course, continued to offer the Burlington's special prices. By combining all these tasks, Wilson was able to shepherd colonists comfortably across the Atlantic and to offer substantially lower prices than competitors. Indeed, when linked with the company's colony method, the Wilson "package" made emigration almost pleasant and probably placed the Burlington far ahead of its competitors in Great Britain.

The only unfortunate aspect to Wilson's "master-plan" was that it threatened the position of the dominant shipping companies operating between Liverpool and New York. Led by the still prestigious Cunard Line, these companies vigorously competed over technological improvement but

co-operated in sharing the market. Specifically, the main lines had combined into the Liverpool Conference, and had set a minimum fare for travelling across the Atlantic. This co-operation had avoided ruinous competition and helped to maintain the status quo as it had evolved on the old New York-Liverpool run. Maintaining the status quo was vital for the older companies such as the Cunard Line, which had prospered during the fifties and sixties, but who were struggling to maintain their positions in the seventies.

Wilson's scheme threatened the establishment in two ways. In the first place it offered cheaper transportation from any point in Great Britain to the American West, thereby threatening the systems evolved by the shipping lines and their sub-agents. Secondly, and perhaps more seriously, it sent settlers almost exclusively to the Baltimore port, thereby ignoring the major lines using the New York facilities. The New York-based lines had huge investments in the New York port, and certainly did not want to undertake the costly switch to Baltimore. Thus, Wilson's threat in early 1872, small as it might have seemed to an outsider, was a very real one in the eyes of the Liverpool-New York shipping interests.

On May 3, 1872, the Lower Council of the Liverpool Conference met behind closed doors.⁵⁷ After a stormy session the Council members decided, in effect, to destroy Wilson and the Burlington's British agency. They resolved to withdraw from Wilson and his sub-agents the right to book passengers on the Liverpool lines. Without this right Wilson could not hope to compete with other companies; Liverpool was the largest British port, and the Liverpool lines were the most dependable, the best known, and the cheapest. Because it prospered under its arrangements with Wilson, the Allen Lines vigorously defended the Burlington's methods, but to no avail. Of the major companies Allen Lines was the only one to concentrate upon Baltimore and was, therefore, the only one interested in changing the major steamship run to America. The other companies re-

fused to desert New York; they forced the Allen Lines to acquiesce by pointing out that they dominated the Conference, and would decide who used the Liverpool port facilities. Allen Lines had no choice but to back down, and the Burlington's British agency had apparently come to an abrupt end.

Before the shipping companies could implement their decision, however, Schaller heard of their meeting and was able to talk them into a postponement.⁵⁸ Schaller had been watching the growing antipathy between Wilson and the companies for a considerable length of time but had not interfered, probably because his authority over the Liverpool office was in doubt. In any event, after he did intervene he immediately wrote Harris, explained the situation, and, reasonably enough, demanded Wilson's dismissal. He further recommended that the company publicly reverse Wilson's policies, and affirm its willingness to comply with the rules established by the Liverpool Conference.⁵⁹

Harris did not remain long inactive when he received Schaller's letter. Harris immediately agreed to co-operate with the Liverpool Conference and further agreed to initiate drastic changes in the British agency.⁶⁰ Schaller was given complete authority over the agency, thereby ending one aspect of the unhealthy division of authority which had plagued it from its commencement. Wilson was demoted to the role of a bookkeeper and placed on a two-month probationary period. Needless to say, Wilson did not enjoy his new role and left the agency in July, 1872, to return to the United States as a full-time agent for the Baltimore and Ohio.⁶¹

Where had Wilson gone wrong? Certainly, his fault was not inactivity, incivility, or improbity. His letter-books indicate that he worked long hours, wrote frequently to his agents and sub-agents, and treated immigrants honestly and politely. Furthermore, there was and is no evidence that he received a commission on settlers staying at McName's inn, nor is there proof that he profited from

his connection with the Baltimore and Ohio. Similarly, Harris, given to violent outbursts when writing disreputable individuals, never wrote a strongly worded letter to Wilson. Indeed, when Wilson returned to the United States, Harris most amicably invited him to Lincoln so as to discuss the British situation.⁶² Wilson's weakness, therefore, rested entirely in his over-enthusiastic attempt to implement the selective approach.

The struggle with the steamship companies was only the most dramatic of the negative effects resulting from Wilson's extreme application of selectivity. His attempt to attract only the most suitable Britons, for example, also led to the creation of an apparently unjustifiably expensive office in Liverpool. Schaller and Harris both complained of the expense of this office, but Wilson quite reasonably pointed out that the selective approach required a large number of clerks in the main office.⁶³ Even more seriously, Wilson's Liverpool office sent only a few emigrants, primarily because it actively discouraged certain types of settlers who, otherwise, might have gone to Iowa and Nebraska. In the letter-books kept in the office are numerous letters informing industrial workers and others that they would not find Iowa or Nebraska attractive for settlement.⁶⁴ This approach limited the numbers migrating considerably and meant that the Burlington did not receive enough settlers. Harris never completely understood the problem confronting the Liverpool office and saw only that considerable money was being spent to recruit too few Britons. Harris always believed, quite superficially, that British farmers would emigrate in droves once they heard of the good land awaiting them. When they didn't, he naturally blamed the man primarily responsible for distributing the relevant information. According to Schaller, the man responsible under the existing system was Wilson.⁶⁵

With Wilson went much of the British agency's selective approach. In the summer of 1872, Schaller introduced a number of alterations which considerably lessened the Liverpool office's concern for immigrants and, more im-

portant, undermined the company's quest for particular types of settlers. In the Liverpool office itself the number of persons was reduced drastically, thereby decreasing the many services undertaken by the office during the Wilson regime.⁶⁶ One of the services dropped was the colony method of emigrating. Harris suggested this deletion because he found the colony method expensive and time-consuming and recognized that it did not even ensure the safe arrival of colonists in Iowa and Nebraska. On at least one occasion, for example, an entire colony was enticed away from a Burlington guide by a Union Pacific agent.⁶⁷ Nor did the colony method serve to attract groups which were really cohesive. Ordinarily the colonies sent from Liverpool had consisted of people drawn from diverse backgrounds and numerous areas. Because of this diversity, the settlers in the colonies had lacked the common bond so necessary to make colonies a viable method of settling.⁶⁸ In other words, the heterogeneity and individualism common in the British migration of the 1870's made it impossible for the Burlington to find farmers willing to emigrate in groups on a co-operative basis.

Schaller also undermined the agency's quest for specific settlers by drastically altering the methods by which the company sought to utilize the migration movement. Under Wilson the agency had attempted to stimulate interest in immigration by numerous activities in essentially the rural regions of Great Britain. Under Schaller the agency increased its efforts in urban areas and decreased its activities in the rural regions. This turn from the farming regions was demonstrated by the transfer of agents from inland agricultural centers to the ports; by a decreased use of rural newspapers; by the elimination of speakers hired to tour the farming counties; and by a huge increase in sub-agents paid on a commission basis and operating without real supervision.

Schaller's alterations were introduced in an effort to increase significantly the quantity, if not the quality, of Britons emigrating to Iowa and Nebraska. He did not

succeed, partly because of difficulties with his staff and partly because of unfavorable general conditions. The staff member who caused Schaller the greatest difficulty was Dr. Alexander King.⁶⁹ King had been accustomed to complete autonomy and naturally resented being made subservient to Schaller. Schaller might have been amenable to King's claim for independence except that there was considerable reason to doubt the value and extent of King's work. By choice King preferred to work as an undercover agent for the Burlington so as to appear as an unbiased observer of western migration. As a result, there was no way in which his impact could be evaluated. Even more seriously, if King was not supervised, there was no guarantee that he was really doing all the work he said he was doing. Schaller, therefore, first attempted to place King under direct supervision, but when this attempt failed, he decided to dispense with his services. In reply King refused to be fired, claiming, quite incorrectly, that his contract contained a right of notice and that the company was deeply indebted to him. So overpowering and verbose was King's disputation that Schaller was occupied with it for months commencing in January, 1873; in fact, Schaller never managed to rid himself of the petulant King.⁷⁰

Schaller also had difficulties with other employees. The agents in the rural areas were strongly opposed to Schaller's desire to move them to the major ports. These agents had lived in the rural areas for several months and had built up lucrative businesses. They had also settled quite completely within their communities, and resented moving to the coast. John Waugh, in Bradford outside Liverpool, particularly protested the move, overtly because of the success of his agency, secretly because he didn't want to leave his lady friend. Waugh's protest became serious, however, because he had been successful and because he was a close friend of Harris. Waugh reported on Schaller's efforts to Harris,⁷¹ and Harris became increasingly dissatisfied with the manager of his British agency.

Of the external factors which confronted Schaller's

BURLINGTON & MISSOURI RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY.

GENERAL EMIGRATION OFFICE,

25, MOORGATE STREET, LONDON, E.C.

A PARTY will sail from Liverpool on ^{31st} 14th May next, by special Royal Mail Steamship for America, and thence by a special train through to Nebraska.

The object of this party is to join the Colony that sailed from England April 6th, each taking up a Homestead of 80 or 160 acres. The Government Fees for each Homestead will amount to £2 10s. 0d.; after five years' settlement upon the land, Government Titles will be granted to each settler. The Land is free. It is also exempt from taxes till the title is granted.

This is a splendid opportunity for those desiring to take up lands and commence farming in this Western State, as they will not only have the protection and advice of one well versed in the route and country and the mode of starting a farm, but will have all the advantages attending a large party settling in one locality.

Additional land, adjoining that selected, may be purchased from the Railway Company at 15s. 4d. per acre, upon long terms of credit.

At one Land Office in this State, last year, over 60 miles of land were entered.

The locality in which the Colony will select their land, is considered one of the best parts of the State—both for rich soil, water power, and timber. Two lines of railroad are now being completed in the vicinity, and will soon be opened for traffic.

Every facility will be given to each of the party in making his selection.

This is a fine opening for those possessing little capital; they can each start a farm for themselves,—those with insufficient means to work a tract of land individually, may club together in small bands, and so work their lands until their profits will enable them to work separately.

Horses will cost £20 each. Mules, £16 each. Oxen, £10 per head. Cows, £8 per head. Sheep, 9s. per head. Hogs, 24s. per 100lbs. Wagon, £19. Plough, £4. Timber for building purposes, sawn and ready for use, from £4 per 1,000 feet.

Provisions are at about the same rate as in England. Clothes, &c., are more expensive.

Through tickets from Liverpool to Nebraska, at following rates:—

Steerage Passage (unlimited supply of provisions) and rail direct to the State	£11	3	6
Intermediate Passage, and Rail direct	14 8 6
Cabin Passage, and First-class Railway fare	28 14 0
Children under 8 years on Steamship, half-fare; under 12 months, 1 guinea.			
Children, 4 years and under 12, on the Railroads, half-fare; under 4 years, free.			

A Train will be chartered from London to Liverpool, to convey passengers going with this party. Railway fare, 12s. 6d.

This party will have their American through Coupon Railway Tickets before leaving England, consequently there will be no delay for exchanging Tickets upon arrival, and no extra expenses incurred.

Special advantages will be given to all who avail themselves of this opportunity of going West.

Those wishing to join this party should make immediate application.

A few Mechanics and Agricultural Laborers would do well to join this party.

Official pamphlets on Nebraska, free on application,—by post, one stamp.

W. H. HAYWARD,

State Commissioner for Nebraska,

25, MOORGATE STREET,

LONDON, E.C.

Broadside used by the Burlington in its British campaign for settlers.

work, perhaps the most important was the decline of "Little Englandism" and the growth of British national and imperial feelings.⁷² With the liberal "Little Englandism" went the tacit acceptance of the inevitability of free trade, the decline of chauvinism, the end of power blocs, the disappearance of war, and the free movements of people. With increased nationalism and imperialism came an emphasis on the necessity of possessing vast natural resources and a belief in national "missions" and "destinies". Empires once again became respectable and popular sentiment in Great Britain favored emigration to the colonies rather than to the American West. In this respect the Burlington's British agency was one of the minor early casualties of late nineteenth century madness.

At the same time there was, contradictorily enough, an increase in British colonization activities by American companies while there was a growth of a specifically anti-American sentiment in Great Britain. More and more land-grant railroads and more and more state agencies were establishing offices in Great Britain, and trying to direct emigration for their own benefit.⁷³ At the same time more Englishmen were developing reservations about emigrating to the United States, mainly because of the conflict over the "Alabama" claims. The United States first requested enormous sums for supposed British complicity during the Civil War, and the British people, most of whom had supported the North, bitterly resented the American charges and claims. As a result, the British press became extremely anti-American during late 1872, and the many American colonization companies such as the Burlington found attracting British colonists correspondingly more difficult.⁷⁴

In the face of these problems Schaller's efforts were comparatively unrewarded. In the spring of 1873 Harris became concerned over Schaller's failures and decided to recall him and to appoint him to the company's Omaha branch office.⁷⁵ To take his place in the British agency Harris called upon Hamilton A. Hill, a Bostonian who had

been secretary of the Boston Board of Trade and the National Board of Trade.⁷⁶

Under Hill the Burlington's British agency became even less selective in its approach to emigration. Hill was paid on a commission basis and was told that the company needed many more settlers than it had been receiving.⁷⁷ At the same time Hill was ordered to reduce the costs of the British operation substantially.⁷⁸ Hill sought to comply with these orders by reducing the number of employees and by increasing the amount of advertising. He used only four offices, located in the major ports, but he made these offices responsible for the circulation of huge amounts of literature. The effect of this change was that the agency became primarily an advertising agency and no longer was primarily concerned with attracting specific types of settlers.

Despite Hill's best efforts, he was unable to increase the numbers of Britons migrating to Iowa and Nebraska. By the summer of 1874 his failure, linked with adverse conditions in the United States, led to the termination of the Burlington's British agency. Hill was recalled and the offices were all closed.⁷⁹ From July, 1874, onward the Burlington's efforts in Great Britain were to consist of the circulation of literature by people hired to do no more; the selective approach had been almost completely disavowed.

The reasons for the decline of the selective approach can be found on many levels. If one looks at the British agency alone, one can see that the manner in which the agency was organized in 1871 undermined the implementation of the approach. The lack of a unified command structure made the office inefficient and distorted the selective approach into uneconomic channels. Harris's insistence on maintaining control, especially in the appointment of agents like King, created immense difficulties for the men in charge in Great Britain. The lack of cohesion between Wilson and Schaller, furthermore, probably led directly to the conflict with the shipping companies. If

Schaller knew the difficulties Wilson was encountering and could foresee the consequences, why did he not act quickly in order to save the company embarrassment? Ultimately it was because the two men did not function as a team, owing partly to personalities but mostly to divided authority.

Within the agency, too, the selective approach implied considerable effort, money, and time. When the company was searching for particular types of settlers, the Liverpool office had to supervise agents, sub-agents, and immigrants. It had to investigate newspaper advertising and to decide upon areas for concentration. It had to evaluate transportation routes in order to provide attractive conditions for prospective settlers. It had to discourage unsuitable settlers, and doing so required an amazing amount of correspondence and an expensive staff. Such complexities made life difficult for the men directly responsible for the British agency.

On the level of total company activity, the selective approach meant that the men in charge in the United States had to be prepared to invest considerable sums in the British agency and to be satisfied with comparatively small numbers of settlers. By the summer of 1872, the company was not prepared to invest sufficient money or to wait long enough. This decline of enthusiasm for the selective approach is best explained by personalities and by changing general economic conditions. The key personalities were George S. Harris and Charles E. Perkins. Harris had really originated the selective approach in the Burlington lines, and, as long as he had control, the selective approach was viable. In July, 1872, however, Harris's health started to fail him. An accident had thrown him into the cold waters of the eastern coast during that summer, and the aftereffects of this accident, along with old age, gradually reduced his effectiveness. By autumn, 1872, he was very ill, and his illness became worse during 1873; by early 1874 he was no longer able to run the Land Department. During Harris's steadily worsening illness,

Perkins, by then vice-president of the Nebraska Line, began to intervene.⁸⁰ Perkins had been anxious to interfere since the beginning of 1872 because of some changes he wanted made in the Land Department.

Perkins had been criticizing the Land Department for two reasons. First of all, he believed that Harris by 1872 was not in complete control.⁸¹ Many settlers were not paying on their land, and the records in the Lincoln office were not even up-to-date. Secondly, Perkins believed that Harris was charging too much for the land in Iowa and Nebraska.⁸² Because of these high prices, settlers were not coming fast enough, and the railroad was not shipping enough freight. In 1873 and 1874 problems created by this lack of business on the line was magnified by poor crops and by the depression. Deeply concerned by these calamities, Perkins became particularly critical of Harris. In response to Perkins' criticism and because of his worsening illness, Harris retired in the spring of 1874.

But even before his retirement, Harris had foresaken much of the selective approach in order to counter the charges of Perkins. It was Harris who ordered Schaller, and later Hill, to make the British agency's search for immigrants quantitative in nature rather than qualitative. It was Harris who ordered the cessation of speaking tours and the abandonment of the colony method. It was Harris who approved transferring agents from agricultural centers to ports. It was Harris who approved Hill's expansion of advertising and cut back of personnel. It was Harris who finally saw that the company could not wait long enough to attract only the most suitable Britons.

But there is still one other level in which the failure of the selective approach must be seen; that level is the entire migration movement of the 1870's. The essence of the selective approach was that only suitable people would be attracted to the American West. The migration movement of the 1870's did not allow the implementation of such a rational approach. On one hand the competition of so many colonization companies meant that large quantities

of settlers were needed to fulfill the dreams and ambitions of the western promoters. On the other hand, the people who were moving into the West were caught up in an atmosphere vaguely reminiscent of a gold rush. Settlement in the new states was an opportunity to gain immense wealth and security; it was also a chance to leave the burdensome tasks implied by complex industrialism and struggling agriculture. As if these conditions were not enough, technological revolutions in the steamship business meant that large quantities of people could migrate rapidly and cheaply. In other words, the circumstances were such that Britons were moving westward and they were moving usually without much forethought or much preparation. Under those circumstances a selective approach was virtually impossible to implement. Ultimately, the sheer weight of the migration movement itself made planned, orderly development of the West impossible during the late nineteenth century.

NOTES

¹ For a general review of the Burlington's colonization activities, see R. C. Overton, *Burlington West, A Colonization History of the Burlington Railroad*, (Cambridge: 1941; New York: 1967).

² R. C. Overton, *Burlington Route, A History of the Burlington Lines*, (New York: 1965), p. 80.

³ For a general review of Harris's work in Missouri, see H. F. Bennett, "The Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad and the Development of Northern Missouri: 1847-1870, A Study of Land and Colonization Policies" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1950). The following summary of Harris's work in Missouri is based on that thesis.

⁴ For a more complete account of Harris's policies, see R. C. Overton, *Burlington West*, pp. 291-328.

⁵ Quoted in H. F. Bennett, "The Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad and the Development of Northern Missouri: 1847-1870," footnote 42, p. 418.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ M. L. Hansen, "Official Encouragement of Immigration to Iowa", *The Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XIX (April, 1921), p. 193.

⁸ R. C. Overton, *Burlington West*, p. 217.

⁹ For an enlarged account of Harris's early work in Europe, see H. F. Bennett. "*The Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad and the Development of Northern Missouri: 1847-1870.*" pp. 509-534.

¹⁰ For a more detailed description of the interest in foreign agents by politicians and private interests, see H. L. Hansen, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Holland's superior agricultural policies were admired by even the most vehement defenders of the excellence of British agriculture. See "The Farming and Peasantry of the Continent", *Blackwood's Magazine*, CVII (January-June, 1870), 26.

¹² For an extensive review of the way in which British writers interpreted the United States, see R. G. Athearn, *Westward the Briton*, (New York: 1953).

¹³ The British ports during the seventies contained thousands of immigrants from Europe. In 1870, for example, over fifty thousand immigrants left Great Britain who were not British in background. W. A. Carrothers, *Emigration from the British Isles* (London: 1926), pp. 306-308.

¹⁴ For a description of the "pauper migration" and a review of the important statistics, see Thomas White Jr., "Immigration", *The Canadian Monthly*, Toronto, Vol. 1 (1872) 193-195.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹⁶ Edginton's efforts are more fully described in R. C. Overton, *Burlington West*, pp. 357-361.

¹⁷ Harris also had some reason to doubt Edginton's integrity. After Edginton had gone to England, Harris found out that "he was reputed to be a defaulter as ex-treasurer of Lucas County, Iowa." Harris, therefore, did not allow Edginton to control much money. Edginton resented this lack of funds, and further resented being placed under the control of Wilson and Schaller. He did not remain with the company for long after the two men arrived in the summer of 1871. See G. S. Harris to C. Schaller, Eric Waugh Manuscript, pp. 226-7. The Eric Waugh manuscript was compiled in 1953 by Mr. Waugh, a former student of Prof. R. C. Overton, University of Western Ontario. The manuscript consists of a verbatim reproduction of Burlington colonization records on file in the Newberry Library, Chicago. Henceforth, references to this manuscript will be made in the abbreviated form, "E.W."

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁹ For a discussion of the difficulties encountered between 1869 and 1873, see W. A. Carrothers, *Emigration From The British Isles* (London: 1929), pp. 216-217.

²⁰ W. S. Reid, *Economic History of Great Britain* (New York: 1954), pp. 335-344.

²¹ F. C. Dietz, *An Economic History of England* (New York: 1942).

²² For a description of the growth of new forms of British agriculture, and a relatively new, favorable view of late nineteenth century British farms, see T. W. Fletcher, "The Great Depression of English Agriculture, 1873-1896", *The Economic History Review*, 1960-1961, Second Series, XIII. Regardless of the positive changes described in this article, there can be no denial that large numbers of British farmers were migrating.

²³ W. S. Reid, *Economic History of Great Britain*, p. 354.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

²⁵ The following summary is based on F. C. Dietz, *An Economic History of Great Britain*, p. 490.

²⁶ E. W., p. 8.

²⁷ The district agents usually received sufficient money to pay for the expenses incurred in operating an office. Henry Wilson to J. Fullerton, July 28, 1871; Wilson, Henry, out-letters to European agents, June 14-September 22, 1871; and March 2-May 10, 1872, manuscript group 73.4, from the microfilm deposited in the Cunningham-Overton Collection, The University of Western Ontario. Henceforth, references to this microfilm will be abbreviated to "O.C.M., 73.4".

²⁸ E.W. p. 26.

²⁹ When Wilson and Schaller first arrived in Great Britain, Edward Edginton was employed in Edinburgh by the Burlington. By July, 1871, Edginton was no longer employed by the company, and Fullerton was in charge of the Glasgow office.

³⁰ Wheeler was appointed by Harris but was not employed for long, primarily because he was undependable. For background information see E.W., p. 12, 13, 17 and 241.

³¹ Abington and Dawson were particularly active in promoting emigration in regions remote from their main centers of activity. The two men both had extensive experience in the United States and were particularly active in making speeches and organizing colonies.

³² No list of agents has been found. The number of one hundred and fifty is based upon a compilation made from reading Wilson's letter books for 1871. One hundred and sixty-three different names were located, but eleven of these names could have belonged to intending immigrants, rather than sub-agents, as the content of the letters did not explain very much about the receivers. It should also be noted that there may have been sub-agents to whom Wilson never wrote. Hence "one hundred and fifty" is conservative.

³³ Henry Wilson to . . . Hare (?), Manchester, June 24, 1871, O.C.M., 73.4.

³⁴ Henry Wilson to George Pinkham, Newcastle, August 18, 1871, O.C.M., 73.4.

³⁵ At least one quarter of the letters written by Wilson in 1871 were to newspaper editors, or were about advertising in local papers.

³⁶ Based on a survey of Wilson's outgoing letters. The exact number was one hundred and fifty-three. Obviously the company might have advertised in newspapers without Wilson having written to their editors.

³⁷ Typical of this group of newspapers were *The Methodist Recorder*, one of the largest journals in Great Britain, and the *Weekly Times*, a popular periodical throughout the Kingdom. Both of these newspapers were published in London.

³⁸ Henry Wilson to W. Hodins, Darlington, April 5, 1872, O.C.M., 73.4.

³⁹ R. C. Overton, *Burlington West*, p. 365.

⁴⁰ E.W., p. 266.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² The Rev. F. Wheeler to G. S. Harris, May 31, 1871, E.W., p. 13.

⁴³ See above, p. 4.

⁴⁴ E.W., p. 11.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁴⁹ H. Wilson to S. Kingston, Spalding, August 28, 1871, O.C.M., 73.4.

⁵⁰ H. Wilson to R. Hillard, Taunton, July 10, 1871, O.C.M., 73.4.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² H. Wilson to C. S. Dawson, August 11, 1871, O.C.M., 73.4.

⁵³ H. Wilson to Albert Gringer, Carlisle, Ireland, April 8, 1872, O.C.M., 73.4.

⁵⁴ H. Wilson to G. Gibbs, Threwsbury, March 14, 1872, O.C.M., 73.4.

⁵⁵ H. Wilson to D. H. MacIvey, Liverpool, March 8, 1872, O.C.M., 73.4.

⁵⁶ See E. L. Babcock, *Spanning the Atlantic* (New York: 1931), pp. 132-136.

⁵⁷ E.W., p. 130.

⁵⁸ E.W., p. 128.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁶⁴ For example, see Henry Wilson to W. Dunn, Landport, March, 1872, O.C.M., 73.4.

⁶⁵ E.W., p. 66.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-117.

⁷⁰ King was finally completely dismissed by Schaller's successor. See *ibid.*, p. 188.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

⁷² For a more complete account of the growth of British nationalism and imperialism, see D. C. Sommervall, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (1929), pp. 182-185.

⁷³ E.W., p. 147.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.

⁷⁶ G. S. Harris to W. Hayward, April 18, 1873, Land Commissioner Out-letters: Foreign, July 30, 1872-August 9, 1875. Manuscript group 73.3 from the microfilm in the Cunningham Collection. Henceforth, references to this microfilm will be abbreviated to "O.C.M., 73.3".

⁷⁷ G. S. Harris to H. A. Hill, April 15, 1873, O.C.M., 73.3.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ For the termination of the office, see numerous letters, English agency papers, 1873-1875, Manuscript group 73.5, available on microfilm, the Overton-Cunningham Collection, The University of Western Ontario, Henceforth, reference to this microfilm will be abbreviated to "O.C.M., 73.5".

⁸⁰ For Harris's direct involvement in the British agency, see C. E. Perkins to G. S. Harris, December 18, 1873, O.C.M., 73.5.

⁸¹ R. C. Overton, *Burlington West*, p. 390.

⁸² For Harris's response to this criticism, see G. S. Harris to C. E. Perkins, January 1, 1873, Miscellaneous papers, 1873, manuscript group 769.71, available on microfilm, the Overton-Cunningham collection, the University of Western Ontario.