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## Article Title: William Jennings Bryan's Plans for World Peace

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Article Summary: William Jennings Bryan considered his cooling-off treaties leading up to World War I to be his most notable contribution to the nation. This article presents a detailed description of the treaties and their proponents and opponents.

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Photographs / Images: William Jennings Bryan signing the 17th Amendment, providing for the direct election of U.S. senators; William Jennings Bryan, secretary of state, standing beside his automobile outside the State, War, and Navy Building, Washington, D.C., on July 28, 1913.

## WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN'S PLANS FOR WORLD PEACE

*By Paolo E. Coletta*

William Jennings Bryan knew that he had been chosen as secretary of state because of his importance as party leader, for he had no special knowledge of international law and diplomacy or experience as an administrator. Rather than technical equipment he brought to the office a rugged honesty, kindness, a large acquaintance with men, willingness to help make the Woodrow Wilson administration a success, and a passion for peace which he had echoed throughout the nation and the world for a decade. At the New York Peace Society dinner of February 26, 1909, Oswald Garrison Villard had sat with President William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, Joseph H. Choate, and Andrew Carnegie. When Bryan entered to deliver his address, Villard remarked:

Strangely enough, he and I were the only ones of that whole group who thought that when you believed war was the sum of all evils and that no good whatever could come of it, you should be true to that belief not only in times of peace but when war came. Five years later the war was upon us and all those public men at the tables of the New York Peace Society that night in 1909 were for our joining in.<sup>1</sup>

Bryan's use of the ethical approach to war reflected his belief that no enemy endangered him; he was not oppressed with the need of security that sobered the chanceries of Europe. Believing that armed preparedness was a causative rather than curative agent of war, and that a volunteer force would suffice to defend America *after* it was attacked, he sought a functional equivalent to war for settling international disputes. Statesmen elsewhere therefore looked to their defenses, for peace is a wonderful objective but may not necessarily be the policy to follow in support of the national interest. "Realists" saw foreign policy as a continual readjustment of a nation's posture toward aspirations

for power that were innate in human nature and sought to direct those aspirations into beneficial channels until they became compatible with the national interest. To them, Bryan was emotional, inspirational, virtuous, moral, idealistic, messianic, and utopian; hence he was expendable and his "moral doctrine" was irrelevant, for brotherly love and the Golden Rule, while sound for individuals, did not apply to governments.

Woodrow Wilson had stated that it would be the irony of fate if his administration must deal with foreign affairs. Perhaps the central irony of Bryan's career was that he was secretary of state when the "Great War" began in Europe.

Bryan had a long-standing interest in the solution of labor troubles. Ascertainment of the facts in dispute alone, he felt, would often decide the question and thereby avoid a strike. Similarly, nations should agree to a procedure whereby the facts in a dispute could be obtained, but they should not be forced to accept the solution indicated by the facts.<sup>2</sup> Since he did not know in 1913 that a Commission of Inquiry was provided for by the Hague Conference of 1899, he reached a parallel conclusion on the settlement of international disputes out of his own experiences,<sup>3</sup> which included his visit to Count Leo Tolstoy in 1904. He agreed with Tolstoy that "peace could be obtained, not by official prattle around green tables, but only by a revolt against governments that exacted military service for organized killing and by the reorganization of society in the interest of social justice."<sup>4</sup>

In his weekly journal *The Commoner*, Bryan had proposed in the issues for February 17 and 24, 1905, that the United States negotiate arbitration treaties which would cover all possible differences, but he had left an escape clause that permitted a state to reject an arbitral tribunal's decision if it were incompatible with national honor or integrity. He then offered an amended plan as a possible way of ending the Russo-Japanese war. In the absence of arbitration treaties, or when exceptions in them did not cover the subject in dispute, he would have international disputes of any kind submitted to a permanent tribunal for investigation. The tribunal would report at the end of one year, during which time neither party would resort to hostilities. He presented this plan in a speech before the Bankers' Club of Tokyo on October 20, 1905, but, he confessed, "the response was not encouraging."<sup>5</sup> He then presented it at the meeting of the Interparliamentary Union in London, July 1906, when it was endorsed by Sir Henry Campbell-

Bannerman, the British premier, approved by the Union as an alternative to mediation, and characterized by Lord James Bryce as "certainly splendid."<sup>6</sup> Bryan advocated the plan persistently thereafter. It was endorsed by the International Peace Conference held in New York in 1908, again by the peace meeting held in Edinburgh in 1910.<sup>7</sup>

The principle of arbitration had been accepted by the United States as early as the Jay Treaty of 1794, and British-American peace had often been maintained by resorting to it in the century following the War of 1812. However, led by Henry Cabot Lodge and George F. Hoar, and supported by such devotees of the new navy as Captain Alfred T. Mahan, a nationalistic and isolationist Senate had persisted in 1897 in excluding from general arbitration treaties those questions which most often give rise to wars—questions of national honor and of independence, vital interests, and the interests of third parties—thereby making them innocuous gestures of good will. Use of the international commissions of inquiry provided for in The Hague Conference, was optional, not mandatory. As they had in the first, so also in the second Hague Conference the Germans opposed the American and British demand for compulsory arbitration, with the result that the arbitration provided was purely voluntary. Nevertheless, the Senate agreed to it only after adding reservations that protected American sovereignty and the Monroe Doctrine, and nothing came out of the arms limitations discussions. In fact, each of the ten conventions adopted sought to humanize war rather than achieve peace.<sup>8</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, who scorned those who railed at the "manly virtues," and who believed that sometimes "righteousness means war," supported John Hay's attempt to write permanent general arbitration treaties with fourteen countries but refused to accept the Senate's requirement that it approve an agreement before an issue could be referred to arbitration.<sup>9</sup> Despite Bryan's writing to and talking with Roosevelt about deleting the usual reservations, Root accepted the principle of senatorial consent and negotiated twenty-five agreements in 1908 which the Senate approved. Root also strongly supported arms reduction at the Second Hague Conference and the creation of a world court and of an International Prize Court as parts of the machinery for the settlement of international disputes. The European powers failed to agree, however, and by also failing to agree to the principles of international law as established by the



*William Jennings Bryan signing the 17th Amendment, providing for the direct election of U.S. senators, at the State Department, Washington, D.C. His wife is sitting to the left of Bryan. This photograph was inscribed, "March 31, 1913, to Beuhler Metcalf," son of Lee Metcalf, editor of Bryan's newspaper, The Commoner.*

London Naval Conference of 1908-1909 left the rules of warfare much in doubt.<sup>10</sup>

When Taft became President, Bryan explained his ideas on conciliation to him, to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, and also to British Ambassador Lord James Bryce. Taft, the honorary president of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, had these ideas included as Article II in his treaties for general arbitration with Britain and France of 1911 and gave Bryan credit for the suggestion. Taft also offered to submit questions involving national honor to the juridical process but disappointed peace circles by failing to establish a commission to investigate world naval disarmament.<sup>11</sup> In part because of Roosevelt's damaging opposition, the Senate again added reservations and required senatorial consent to the arbitration treaties. Although the treaties passed, in March, 1912, they were really useless, yet they did advertise the fact that three world powers were willing to accept commissions of inquiry in principle.<sup>12</sup> Bryan had vigorously supported Taft's treaties, some of which, as secretary of state, he would seek to renew, but to surmount the Senate hurdle to arbitration he offered his conciliation—or "cooling off"—treaties also.

Pacifists applauded Bryan's appointment as secretary of state. For example, Brand Whitlock wrote to tell him of the "joy" he had in his selection: "I am glad that at last there is a man in that position whose belief in democracy and love for humanity are such that under his leadership we may expect our diplomacy to accomplish high results in doing away with war and the spirit of war and—is it too much to hope?—an approach to universal peace."<sup>13</sup> Such leaders of the American peace movement as James Brown Scott—a technical delegate to the second Hague Conference, editor of the *American Journal of International Law*, and a director of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes—also expected much from Bryan in the field of world peace. When Wilson and Bryan indicated their strong desire to break away from the "realism" of Roosevelt and the "dollar diplomacy" of Taft and return to the "traditional" American policy of friendship with Latin America and with China and of peace for the world, Scott heartily applauded Bryan's proposed commissions of inquiry.<sup>14</sup>

Woodrow Wilson, who had been a member of the American Peace Society since 1908, was as convinced as Bryan was of the

validity of enforcing peace through moral sanctions alone. He had agreed to Bryan's accepting the secretaryship on condition that he be given a free hand to negotiate treaties of conciliation, and soon after taking his oath of office gave Bryan permission to draft his cooling-off treaty plan. Bryan incorporated some suggestions made by Wilson and submitted the following draft:

The parties hereto agree that all questions of whatever character and nature whatever, in dispute between them, shall, when diplomatic efforts fail, be submitted for investigation and report to an international commission (the composition to be agreed upon); and the contracting parties agree not to declare war or begin hostilities until such investigation is made and report submitted.

The investigation shall be conducted as a matter of course, without the formality of a request from either party; the report shall be submitted within (time to be agreed upon) from the date of the submission of the dispute, and neither party shall utilize the period of investigation to change its military or naval program, but the parties hereto reserve the right to act independently on the subject matter in dispute after the report is submitted.<sup>15</sup>

In a supplemental memorandum Bryan added that the international commissions would be composed of five members: one national chosen by each of the contracting countries; one member to be chosen by each of the contracting countries from some other country; and the fifth to be agreed upon by the two governments. He proposed that the time agreed upon be one year; however, the nations could agree to a shorter or longer time. Moreover, he presented his ideas "for consideration, and not with the intention of imposing any fixed conditions. The principle of investigation being accepted, the details are matters for conference and consideration."<sup>16</sup>

Bryan was in a hurry to perfect the plan, for he wished to present it to the diplomatic corps before Bryce returned to England. On April 8, 1913, Wilson gave the cabinet a copy of Bryan's plan, saying that its acceptance would be a strong step toward the ending of war. Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson suggested that the United States might better call a disarmament conference of all the powers. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels heartily agreed with the need for disarmament but thought that Bryan's plan should be taken up first. "If we could get the nations to agree never to fight until they have talked over the matters in dispute," he said, "the day would not be far distant when we would be able to secure disarmament."<sup>17</sup> Wilson then left to deliver his tariff reform address to Congress, and the peace plan was not discussed in the cabinet until April 15.

At that time Bryan argued that his plan avoided the usual objection made to arbitration treaties—that matters of honor

could not be arbitrated—and Wilson upheld him. Now Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison objected because, as Daniels recalled, “he thought it would be as easy to get the countries to adopt a treaty to reduce their armament as it would this.” The other members disagreed with him and noted that the success of Bryan’s plan might lead to the holding of a disarmament conference in the future. Agreed that Bryan’s plan could be an entering wedge toward disarmament, the cabinet and Wilson endorsed it and Wilson asked Bryan to take the matter up informally with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “and if they approved it, ask them to sound the Senators so that the sentiment of the Senate [*sic*] and if a majority of the Senate favored it, to get the matter out for publication that the whole world might be thinking of it.”<sup>18</sup>

Bryan talked with Augustus O. Bacon, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who called his committee together. Bryan explained his plan in a two-hour session held on April 23. Some senators objected because the United States, by having a treaty with one nation, would be prevented from preparing to meet the attack of another with which it had no treaty. Others said that the United States could not afford to submit questions of national honor or vital interest or promise to refrain for a given time from making defensive preparations. Bryan won the committee to his view only after agreeing to omit the clause barring an arms buildup.<sup>19</sup> To avoid the mangling given the Root treaties by the Senate, he had also contacted each Senator individually and explained to him that the consent of the Senate would not be needed for a commission to begin its work. Having obtained the approval of the Senate before broaching his plan to the public or to foreign diplomats, Bryan was thus able to present his plan with his government’s officialdom solidly behind him.

On April 24 the diplomatic corps heard Bryan formally present what he persistently called “the President’s plan” to settle all disputes without recourse to war. Now facts could be separated from questions of honor, he said. Time would be given for calm, rational consideration of problems; and time would also allow world public opinion to mobilize against war and compel a peaceful settlement. He did not intend to replace arbitration as a method of settling international disputes and would work to extend that principle as various arbitration treaties came up for renewal. However, the questions nations reserved from arbitration were the very ones that could easily lead to war. Hence his plan to

cover questions beyond the scope of arbitration. He then gave hearers printed copies of the plan and asked them to seek its adoption.<sup>20</sup>

Bryan refrained from publicizing the acceptance of his treaty plan until he had received assurances of approval from the important powers. On May 9 he explained his project to the public, saying in part, "The world is advancing in morals. . . . There is a greater sense of kinship among men than there ever was before. There is more altruism on this earth than the earth has previously known. . . . No nation shall go beyond us in its advocacy of peace or in its work for peace."<sup>21</sup> His progress is revealed in letters to Wilson and to his brother, Charles Wayland Bryan. On May 26 he wrote to Wilson:

I am glad to report that Sweden today announced acceptance of the principle embodied in *your* peace plan. . . . Sweden makes the fifth country to accept the principle, Italy having been the first, Great Britain the second, France the third and Brazil the fourth. I have not yet made any announcement to the public, because I am hoping for acceptance from Argentina, Peru, Norway, The Netherlands and Russia. . . .

I am encouraged to believe that in the course of time we shall have practically all of the nations bound to us by these agreements. The German Ambassador promised to take the matter up with his Government when he arrived there.<sup>22</sup>

On June 5 he wrote to Brother Charles:

You will be pleased to know that twelve nations have now responded to the invitation to unite on the peace plan. As we have among them Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Germany and Italy, with three of the minor European countries, we may as well count the victory as won. Japan will join as soon as the difficulties with this country are settled and I am sanguine enough to believe that before next Christmas, we will have a sufficient number of countries bound by our agreements so as to make war practically impossible. The plan for investigation is so simple that many did not realize how far-reaching it is, but I have had two Ministers say to me today that it is the greatest step towards peace taken in a century.<sup>23</sup>

In an undated note to Charles he added: "My peace treaties are moving on. . . . This treaty plan will be my monument. It is worth being Secretary to get a chance to negotiate them."<sup>24</sup>

Arbitration treaties with Spain, Great Britain, Norway, Mexico, Portugal, and Switzer]and expired by limitation in 1913. Various senators had a "very strong feeling" against renewing the treaty with Britain because the latter might demand the right to arbitrate the Panama Canal tolls question.<sup>25</sup> Then Ambassador Walter Hines Page reported from London that Bryan's cooling-off plan, "if presented here, [would] provoke the answer that the renewal of the arbitration treaty should come first," adding, "That is more definite, concrete, helpful."<sup>26</sup> Events moved more

rapidly with the new year, however. On January 17, 1914, the asthmatic Sir Cecil Spring Rice, who replaced Bryce, wheezed to Bryan that he had seen the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and that progress was being made,<sup>27</sup> and a happy Bryan notified Wilson of that fact. Wilson replied:

I congratulate you with all my heart on the readiness of Great Britain to take up the new peace treaty proposal with serious intent to come to a definite agreement with us about it. It is a notable advance and ought to give you great personal gratification. Your note conveying the news gave me the deepest sort of pleasure.<sup>28</sup>

On March 15 and again on March 17, Page congratulated Bryan on the progress of the treaty with Britain. Although British public opinion had severely criticized the attitude of the United States toward Mexico and also criticized Grey because "he bows too low to the Americans," Page noted that "Grey keeps his firm considerate course" and had drafted a treaty that his government was willing to sign. However, he must first submit the treaty to the self-governing dominions for their approval. Moreover, he demanded assurance that the United States Senate need not be consulted in case the treaty was used.<sup>29</sup> It may be, too, that he paused to consider how the treaty would affect the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, for this treaty bound either nation to join the other in case of war with a third party unless a treaty of arbitration existed.

Interested in principle rather than detail, Bryan permitted a great deal of latitude in the drafting of the treaties. By conceding wording that suited the individual prejudices of the various countries he won many of them over. Article I, however, always provided that disputes failing of solution by diplomatic means, in the absence of provision for arbitration, should be submitted to a permanent international commission of inquiry. Bryan thus clearly related the international commission to arbitration by stating that whenever diplomatic methods had been used but had failed, or when subjects in dispute were not covered by arbitration, the dispute should go to a commission of inquiry. Nor did he confuse the consequences of arbitration and inquiry, for he admitted that a commission of inquiry merely reported. However, he believed that a report based upon careful investigation would be tantamount to a settlement. In many cases, as between The Netherlands and the United States, that either nation would declare war or begin hostilities was unthinkable. Nevertheless, Bryan believed that such an agreement would prove helpful

because it would invite other nations, to whom war was not unthinkable, to investigate before fighting, or better, to investigate instead of fighting, and also because it would bring before commissions of inquiry matters nations often refused to submit to arbitration.

While the number of men on the commissions and the method of selecting them varied, Bryan weakened the element of nationalism by including the nationals of different countries. More important was the provision vesting a commission with authority to assume the initiative if the governments involved did not themselves lay the dispute before it. To prevent signatories from taking refuge in interminable diplomatic exchanges, he provided that a dispute insoluble by diplomacy would be submitted to the commission "at once," that the reaction of a commission to its responsibility should be "spontaneous," and that the governments should furnish the commission "with all the means and facilities required for its investigation and report." It was apparent, then, that there was to be no escape from arbitration, on the one hand, if a treaty existed, or from the investigation and report of a commission, whether the government willed or not. Such being the case, Bryan's plan was important because investigation would in most cases amount to settlement and because no nation could in the long run withstand world public opinion favorable to peaceful settlement. Moreover, nations refusing to sign would be suspected of contemplating war. Rather than being a weakness, the fact that the report of a commission attached no obligation to a signatory was the crowning glory of Bryan's plan. While war was leashed for a year, the pressure of public opinion would force acceptance of the report.<sup>30</sup>

The greatest weakness of the treaties was the omission of the prohibition against a military buildup during the cooling-off period or the provision of a clause releasing both parties from such restriction if either party to a dispute was endangered by a third power. As Bryan explained to Senator William J. Stone, who succeeded Bacon as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, few if any of the major powers would sign treaties barring such a buildup, and he was keenly aware that the Senate might refuse to consent to the twenty treaties he was ready to place before it on the same ground. At Stone's request he submitted a comparison of these treaties, then asked Wilson to send Stone a statement to be read to his committee which specifically noted that "the treaties

do not contemplate bringing each case of investigation before the Senate.”<sup>31</sup> On August 13 Wilson wrote Stone an eloquent exposition on the treaties:

Now that the peace treaties are under actual consideration, may I not send you a line to say that I most earnestly hope that it may be possible to secure their ratification without any restrictions as to their scope? They are intended to cover all questions in dispute of every character, so that no cause for war will be left out. This is their peculiar characteristic and is what gives them a force and character which other treaties have not had. If we can have investigation of all questions not covered by other treaties, we will hold war at arm's length in such a way as I believe to render it practically impossible. This is a time when such action on our part would make the deepest possible impression upon the world and I covet and pray for it on that account.<sup>32</sup>

Wilson and Bryan were rewarded that same day when the Senate approved of eighteen of the treaties.<sup>33</sup> And on September 21 Wilson wrote Stone again:

It seems to me of such peculiar importance just at this moment that the treaties with England, France, and Japan should be ratified that I venture to write this note to ask if you will not make unusual efforts to have a quorum of the committee present on Wednesday next when Mr. Bryan is to present the treaties to them. It would dampen the whole feeling of the country, I think, at this particular time if these treaties were not acted upon promptly and with cordiality.<sup>34</sup>

Reaction to Bryan's peace plan varied from violent criticism to outright adulation. The Carabao Club, a society of army and navy officers who had served in the Philippines, characterized the peace efforts of "Hon. Wm. Jenny Bryan" as "piffle" and so "roasted" rather than "toasted" him and the administration that Wilson ordered an investigation and then had the secretaries of War and Navy issue letters of reprimand to individuals at fault.<sup>35</sup> The *Army and Navy Journal* charged that Bryan was hurting the nation's interest by proposing that all disputes could be adjusted without resort to war.<sup>36</sup> Albert Shaw spoke for many when he asserted that an efficient army and a strong navy were excellent adjuncts to a nation like the United States which had none but pacific intentions and sincerely desired peace.<sup>37</sup>

The *New York Sun* suggested that Bryan offer his peace plan to the Moros, and the *Wall Street Journal* believed that the signing of the treaties would be followed by a great naval building race.<sup>38</sup> While deeming them valuable as an expression of intention, the *Chicago Tribune* and *Brooklyn Eagle* believed that treaties alone would not stop a hot-headed people from going to war. Bryan's plan, scoffed *The New Republic*, made "as much sense as a demand for omelets accompanied by the specification that no eggs

be broken.”<sup>39</sup> A German newspaper wondered how Bryan could offer a peace plan to Europe while threatening war with Mexico; the *London Mail* questioned whether it was necessary for “this eminent idealist” who faced many diplomatic problems in his own department “to dissipate his energies in preparing for the millennium.”<sup>40</sup>

The signing of the first treaty, with San Salvador, prompted some mirth because, twitted the *Boston Transcript*, the danger of attack from that country had been imminent for some time.<sup>41</sup> “It’s a humiliation to this country that its diplomatic relations should be conducted by William Jennings Bryan. He doesn’t know the first principles of what he is doing. Grape juice diplomacy; Lukewarm diplomacy would be a better name,” exclaimed George W. Wickersham, Taft’s attorney general.<sup>42</sup> “Nothing can be truer than . . . the folly, if not the wickedness of making treaties which have no force and no intent of enforcement behind them. I was away last summer when those fatuous treaties were put through by Bryan. If I had been there I should have resisted them,” Henry Cabot Lodge wrote to Roosevelt.<sup>43</sup>

However, the British press, while originally characterizing Bryan’s plan as amateurish, gradually swung around to its support,<sup>44</sup> and some influential American publicists had second thoughts about it. *Review of Reviews* Editor Albert Shaw noted that the plan suffered from “serious difficulties.” A nation unprepared for war, or one with weak defenses, he said, would be at a disadvantage against an aggressively minded power with a highly developed military capability. Nevertheless, the weaker power “would be better off under Mr. Bryan’s proposals, because of the likelihood that the work of a board of inquiry would result in the substitution of arbitration for war.”<sup>45</sup> What with the European powers glowering at each other across their fortified frontiers, asserted the editor of *The Nation*, it would be well for the United States to follow the same course that is being followed in the pacific settlement of disputes between capital and labor: “[We] believe that Mr. Bryan’s proposal, if backed by the full support of the American government, represents just that measure of advance along the path of peace for which the limited intelligence and conscience of the nations are ripe.”<sup>46</sup>

Through speeches, his *Commoner*, and articles in magazines Bryan defended and popularized his cooling-off idea. He revealed great familiarity with the stock arguments of America’s organized

peace groups but was more perceptive than were most of them of the economic roots of imperialism and of war.<sup>47</sup> To him, the peace crusade that had flowered since the Spanish-American War was a highly desirable part of the Progressive movement. To him, as to Wilson, the "new freedom" drive for domestic reforms should be paralleled by an equally sincere and devoted striving for the elimination of armaments and for world peace.<sup>48</sup> Like Wilson he was highly motivated by a strong religious background to seek peace.<sup>49</sup> Like Wilson, too, he believed that governments, not their peoples, made war. By giving substance to the liberal Jeffersonian belief in the doctrine that government rests only on the consent of the governed, war would be made impossible, for the plain people were basically pacifistic. Moreover, both he and Wilson had great faith that the moral sense of man had progressed from the predatory state to the altruistic level where he could eliminate war.

Support for this cause came from many political enemies as well as friends, among them businessmen like Andrew Carnegie, James Speyer, Frank A. Vanderlip, Jacob Schiff, and Henry Ford; educators and publicists like Charles W. Eliot, Edward Ginn, and David Starr Jordan; labor leaders like Samuel Gompers; lawyers, jurists, and statesmen like Robert La Follette, Theodore Marburg, Elihu Root, Oscar Straus, William H. Taft, and Samuel Untermyer; philosophers like William James; distinguished authorities on international law like Dr. James Brown Scott; sponsors of international brotherhoods such as the Young Men's Christian Association, Christian Endeavor, and John R. Mott's Christian Students Federation; anti-Navy leaders in Congress like Senator Eugene Hale and Representative James L. Slayden; and such diverse religious leaders as Rabbi Stephen Wise, James Cardinal Gibbons, and Mary Baker Eddy.

In New York City, on May 13, 1913, in a toast to representatives of the British Empire at the international conference that was arranging the celebration of a hundred years of peace among the English-speaking people, Bryan suggested that friendship be substituted for battleships.<sup>50</sup> Distressed by the objection to his peace plan by what he called the "jingo" press, he told the New York Peace Society and the Washington Peace Society that

War is in the interest of a few people, not of all. The profits are garnered by a few, while the masses pay the taxes. A few men gain glory, while the mothers of the nation furnish sons who make food for the battlefields. Back of much of the furor for war is a selfish interest in the manufacture of battleships. They are men who are so unpatriotic that they try to stir up trouble in other countries against their own so as to make personal profit therefrom.

An excellent illustration of his belief that morality moved the world was in his saying that fortunately there were three great forces at work throughout the world that made for peace: "a growing intelligence, an increasing understanding of the doctrine of brotherhood, and a growing power of the people to control their destiny through the control of their government."<sup>51</sup>

However, Bryan frequently failed to transfer his enthusiasm for peace to his auditors. When asked by a British newspaper correspondent in the winter of 1913 whether Mexico would be invited to sign a treaty that offered to solve "every phase of international controversy," he at first stated: "We will leave Mexico in particular out of the discussion," then suggested that such a treaty would be offered if Wilson could find a Mexican government worthy of recognition. He arose from his chair and walked over to a window facing the Potomac, at the moment lashed to foam by seventy-mile winds. "So surely as that stormy condition will subside and the surface of the water will become calm again," he said, "so surely will Arbitration Treaties, which are made really binding, and the clauses of which are observed conscientiously, pave the way to a permanent means of settling international disputes." Wrote the reporter, "How a Secretary of State can talk in that way when the unsolved problem of Mexico seems to give the lie even to the soberest word that can now be uttered by the Government is a puzzle for the psychologists of optimism." He concluded that Bryan was guilty of making the fatal assumption that the word of a nation was its perfect bond and that its promises would be redeemed honorably.<sup>52</sup>

Of the forty nations represented in the United States in 1913, thirty-six adopted Bryan's plan in principle and thirty eventually signed treaties. El Salvador was the first to sign, on August 3, 1913.<sup>53</sup> The adherence of Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, and Nicaragua by the end of the year indicated the great appeal the plan held for Central America. The Netherlands was the first European country to sign, on December 18, 1913, and Bolivia the first from South America. Six nations signed in February, 1914, and an additional five in July, including Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Although the Great War had begun, Bryan exerted such great pressure on France and Britain that he finally won his point.<sup>54</sup> By previous arrangement, representatives of France and Britain gathered in Bryan's office for an elaborate celebration staged by Bryan, with Mrs. Bryan present by his special invitation,

and signed on the same day, September 15, 1914, as did China, but Britain signed only after Bryan had agreed to back the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption for American coastwise shipping—and perhaps because the British sought to convince Bryan of their abiding love of peace despite their war with Germany. Eventually all the countries of Latin America signed but two: Mexico, which the United States did not recognize, and Colombia, which was disputing with the United States over problems arising from Roosevelt's seizure of Panama in 1903.<sup>55</sup> Of the major powers, Japan was the only one that did not agree, presumably because of unsettled problems outstanding with the United States.<sup>56</sup> Germany, Austria, and Turkey did not sign because it did not suit their interests to do so.

With the governments of more than a billion people, two-thirds of the world's population, pledged not to resort to war until after matters in dispute had been investigated, Bryan called his plan a success even though a war was being fought in Europe. War or no war, he wanted the treaties signed. "War makes us especially anxious to negotiate treaties with European countries, so that the treaties will cover any disputes that may arise between us and European governments during the war. Possibility of dispute is remote, but still possible," he cabled to Ambassador James Gerard in Berlin on August 17.<sup>57</sup> He telegraphed Constantin Dumba, the Austrian ambassador, who complained about leaving his Massachusetts North Shore vacation to return to Washington in the "tropical heat" of August, in order to press him for a rapid conclusion to the peace treaty negotiations.<sup>58</sup>

Never one to give up, he wrote to Joseph Tumulty, President Wilson's personal secretary, on September 27: "Now if Germany and Austria come in our joy will be complete."<sup>59</sup> He directed Gerard to again approach Germany, for "if Germany and Austria-Hungary will agree . . . the success of the plan will be complete,"<sup>60</sup> and also made a personal appeal to Count Johann von Bernstorff, German ambassador.<sup>61</sup> Russia signed on October 1, and Bryan was still trying as late as October 5 to interest Turkey in signing. Meantime Bernstorff confessed that it was impossible for Germany to be the only one of the great powers to refuse to sign such a treaty and that he had urged his government to at least give its assent in principle.<sup>62</sup>

Germany and Austria-Hungary endorsed the principle of Bryan's plan but refused to sign treaties. As Foreign Minister

Gottlieb von Jagow explained when Gerard called, and as the kaiser had explained to Colonel Edward M. House, who visited him in June, Germany's greatest advantage was her huge standing army ready for sudden assault. A cooling-off period would allow other states to mobilize their forces and thus reduce Germany's bargaining power.<sup>63</sup> On July 15 Bryan had directed Gerard to see Bernstorff, then visiting in Germany, accompany him to the Foreign Office, "and suggest the propriety of considering at once the details of the treaty so that Germany can sign on the same day as Britain and France." Bernstorff had replied via Gerard: "Am afraid no use taking steps about peace treaty." In sum, Gerard reported, there was "absolutely no chance of Germany signing."<sup>64</sup>

Upon his return to the United States from his regular summer leave, Bernstorff called personally on Bryan, who exclaimed with great warmth: "Now you see I was right when I kept repeating that preparation for war was the best way of bringing war about. All the European Powers were armed to the teeth and always maintained that this heavy armament was necessary to protect them from war. Now the fallacy is obvious. We alone live in peace because we are unarmed." Bryan gave him copies of the British, French, Russian, and Dutch treaties, and Bernstorff promised that he would induce his government to accept a similar treaty.<sup>65</sup> He proved to be impotent to do so, however, and Dumba submitted a similar appeal to his government with the same result.<sup>66</sup> The refusal of Germany and Austria-Hungary to sign Bryan's treaties meant that their relations with the United States remained unaffected and unchanged, thus justifying Senator Henry F. Ashurt's comment that "No one, except Bryan, believes that his treaties will preserve the peace."<sup>67</sup>

While Wilson thought that a delay of nine months would have avoided the war,<sup>68</sup> some American and British leaders of opinion took Bryan's treaties lightly. For example, on October 4, 1914, which Wilson had dedicated as a "Day of Peace," the *New York Sunday Times* quoted Roosevelt, who saw world events and policies in terms of power, as having said that the treaties, "although important, are slightly harmful" and indicated that they would not be invoked even if the interests of the United States were involved. "Thank God that Roosevelt does not speak for the American people," Bryan retorted, adding that it was evident from context that Roosevelt had not even read the treaties.<sup>69</sup>

In a long speech at the New York Prayer Day Exercises, Bryan then revealed that even the war failed to lessen his belief in the ultimate victory of his peace principle. It was neither necessary to consider the causes that provoked the conflict nor to assess responsibility for it, he said. To this invertebrate optimist and moralist the important objective was to find a solution for war with a view to saving future generations from a similar fate. "We must not be discouraged if this, the greatest of all wars, breaks out just when we were most hopeful of the substitution of reason for force in the settlement of international disputes. It may be that the world needed one more awful object-lesson to prove conclusively the fallacy of the doctrine that preparedness for war can give assurance of peace." Even if a nation burdened with the heavy load of revenge overcame a hated enemy, the very use of force would leave its evil mark, for moral principles were as binding upon nations as upon individuals and "love is the only foundation upon which permanent peace can rest." Wilson had grasped eagerly at the offer to mediate the Mexican problem and thereby had given strong impetus to the cause of conciliation. By offering itself as a disinterested mediator in the European conflagration the United States could provide a unique service to humanity, the greatest of all service.<sup>70</sup>

While Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey had told Ambassador Walter Hines Page in June, 1913, that he was "greatly interested in Mr. Bryan's plan for making war harder to begin,"<sup>71</sup> Spring Rice, British ambassador, from the beginning had thrown cold water on it. As he observed to Gray in March, 1914:

It is most probable that the treaties will not be worth very much. This incontestable fact does not in the least affect the strong desire of Mr. Bryan to negotiate the new treaties, and there is no reason in the world why he should not be humoured, as long as we do not attach too much importance to the treaties when negotiated.<sup>72</sup>

Moreover, as Page wrote to Bryan on September 1, 1914, he had "pushed Grey to the uttermost" but found him preoccupied with the war. "This terrible war sidetracks everything," he added.<sup>73</sup> The British had signed nevertheless. Now, conscious of the failure of his government to avoid the war by means of holding a conference early in August, Spring Rice told Grey that the treaty was "a good thing at a time when serious questions may turn up at any moment."<sup>74</sup> He then confessed to Bryan:

It may be that some people at first spoke lightly of your idea. No one who has studied the diplomatic history of the events leading up to the present disastrous war can ever speak

lightly of your idea again. For it is abundantly manifest that even one week's enforced delay would probably have saved the peace of the world.<sup>75</sup>

Such newspapers as the *London Times* also received news of the signing of the British treaty as "double welcome at a moment when we have been forced into a great war."<sup>76</sup> Moreover, when British violations of America's neutrality angered Wilson and Britain feared that he might organize a league of neutrals, Spring Rice advised his government to invoke the Bryan treaty.<sup>77</sup> Both Bernstorff and Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Constantin Dumba believed that difficulties over the U-boat campaign could have been ironed out in a twelvemonth if Germany had accepted Bryan's treaty plan and that the *Lusitania* affair would not have become an acute crisis,<sup>78</sup> but there seems to be an inconsistency in their thinking, for two years rather than one elapsed between the time the *Lusitania* was sunk and the United States went to war.

Bryan's belief in the efficacy of his cooling-off treaties remained undiminished as the war progressed. Late in the summer of 1914 he got some old swords from the War Department, had them melted down and molded into miniature plowshare paperweights about six inches long. He presented them to Wilson, each member of the cabinet, each representative who had signed his peace treaties, such fellow pacifists as Carnegie, and some personal friends. "It was literally turning swords into plowshares," he later wrote his cabinet colleague, Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory. On one side of the plowbeam was the phrase Bryan had coined when seeking to avert the crisis with Japan over California's alien land law—"Nothing is final between friends,"—which he said was the "most valuable sentiment I have contributed to diplomacy." On the other side was the phrase "Diplomacy Is the Art of Keeping Cool." One can only imagine the straight face with which he explained to Gregory that he had used the phrase first "when I was welcoming an international meeting of refrigerator men." On the base were inscribed the words "They Shall Beat Their Swords Into Plowshares. Isaiah 2:4."<sup>79</sup>

Even as late as January 20, 1915, Bryan looked upon his treaties as monuments to peace, for he wrote to a friend:

There is a sort of poetic justice in the fact that I am in position to sign these treaties myself. I first proposed the plan when Roosevelt was President. Had he put the plan into operation I would have had nothing to do with it. I next brought it to the attention of President Taft. Had he been successful in his efforts to apply the plan partially I would have had nothing to

do with it. . . . Had I been elected in 1908 I would have endeavored to have the plan embodied in treaties with other countries, but had I been elected President I could not, myself, have signed the treaties and it is possible that the world would not have been ready, at that time, for the general acceptance of the plan. But I came into the office of the Secretary of State just when the time was ripe and the world ready and the honor of signing the treaties has fallen to me, and, as they will in all probability continue indefinitely, my name will be found in the chancelleries of the world attached to living treaties that it is hoped will form the basis of an enduring peace.<sup>80</sup>

Contrary to his belief, Bryan had simply had abominably bad luck in proposing his plan during the mad armaments race that preceded World War I. The declaration by First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill in favor of a year's holiday in naval building induced the House of Representatives on December 8, 1913, by a vote of 317 to 11, to adopt a resolution calling upon the President to cooperate with Great Britain to such an end. Nothing came of it. Bryan's treaties were given a black eye when Austria rejected Serbia's request that their dispute be submitted for arbitration to The Hague Court, and note was made that they contained no sanctions for preventing the outbreak of war. As yet, of course, leaders of nations and their professional diplomats regarded war as normal and inescapable in the absence of dedicated and willful commitment by the nations to peace and the validity of international agreements. The war in Europe tragically demonstrated the ineffectiveness of both conventional and customary international law either to bind the nations together in peacetime or to restrict and control their actions in wartime. What good was international law when treaties were regarded as "scraps of paper"; when Belgium, whose neutrality had long been guaranteed, could become a principal battlefield; when laws of land warfare and humanity were disregarded in favor of atrocities and devastation; when even time-honored rules of naval warfare were disregarded? Better that the United States assume responsibility in world affairs and counter threats to peace by building a large navy and joining it to Britain's in an Anglo-Saxon accord, said some.<sup>81</sup>


While the *New York Times* labelled Bryan's effort as "one of those rare ventures in the field of world affairs of which it may be said that it could do no possible harm and may do much good,"<sup>82</sup> others like Choate and Perry Belmont called for preparedness, and Roosevelt horrified Bryan by saying that the treaties would do no harm because we would not observe them if they did not suit our purpose.<sup>83</sup>

Bryan's treaties with the three major allied European powers, Britain, France, and Russia, made war between them and the United States technically impossible and also provided a method short of war for settling problems arising between them.<sup>84</sup> On the other hand, Germany's refusal to accept his treaty not only gave Allied propagandists leave to cite additional evidence of Berlin's warmongering but left the United States free to enter the war against Germany in 1917.

Bryan's success in winning ratification of thirty treaties in one year remains an unprecedented achievement, and Wilson gave his success a prominent place in his first annual message. However, Bryan's treaty plan was often misunderstood, persistently misrepresented as to its nature and object, opposed by so-called "realists," and never used. It proved impossible to maintain the commissions they required, and it could have been applied universally only if several thousand commissions were established.<sup>85</sup> While designed to isolate the United States only from war, they also acted to insulate the United States against the acceptance of international responsibilities and to weaken the demand of realists for armaments commensurate with the needs of America's security and the power to support American ideals and interests. Some of the Allies thought that Bryan's attachment to peace, mediation, and neutrality in the face of German militarism indicated that he was pro-German, and public opinion in the United States questioned whether his resignation over the *Lusitania* crisis because of his difference with Wilson over the method rather than the object of peace was in the best national interest.<sup>86</sup> As a personal friend of many years put it:

In the end, he [Bryan] was caught in the pathetic position of a beautiful theory confronted and controverted by an inescapable fact. Neither his treaties nor anything he did kept the United States out of the war. Mars triumphant consigned his treaties to the dust heap. Thoroughly convinced when he entered the Department of State that he was destined to make an enduring contribution to the cause of peace, he suffered a disaster that hurt him much more than his three presidential defeats."<sup>87</sup>

Except when certain exigencies in the Caribbean provoked him to demand the use of naval power against people who understood only force, Bryan had nevertheless given eloquent expression in an age of cynicism, war, and imperialism to his faith that an un-Christian world could be run according to the literal tenets of Christianity and that brotherly love would conquer self-interest between men and between nations. He had gone further than any



*William Jennings Bryan, then secretary of state, standing beside his automobile outside the State, War, and Navy Building, Washington, D.C., on July 28, 1913.*

other American in the direction of the pacific settlement of disputes, for in addition to his peace plan he had obtained the Senate's approval for the renewal of twenty-four of Root's twenty-five arbitration treaties and also reminded the signatories of the Second Hague Conference that a third conference had been called for "in the course of 1915."<sup>88</sup>

Although the Bryce program of 1915 for preventing future wars took Bryan's treaties as a starting point, it would punish violators by economic pressure, embargoes, and in the last resort, war.<sup>89</sup> Speaking at the twenty-third annual meeting of the American Society for International Law, James Brown Scott said:

I venture to predict, notwithstanding the frequent disrespect and lack of appreciation of Mr. Bryan, that he, of all the peacemakers, is the one who has contributed most to the peaceful settlement of international disputes by holding the hands of war, by staying the sword until such time as nations can resort to the forum of reason.

Scott, who edited Bryan's thirty treaties for publication in 1919,<sup>90</sup> sent a copy of them to the Nobel Prize Committee, saying that the peace treaty plan was made the chief cornerstone of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Divested of the provision

reserving independent action, and with no credit given to Bryan, Bryan's plan appeared in Article XII.<sup>91</sup> In 1922 the Assembly of the League adopted a plan of conciliation essentially along the line of the Bryan treaties. It appeared again in the Locarno Treaties. On the occasion of the threat of war between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925, and particularly in the Lytton Commission of 1931, its utility when sponsored by a world organization was proved. The plan appeared in the Four-Power Treaty of 1921; the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 may be considered a development of it,<sup>92</sup> and fact-finding commissions of the United Nations have been commonplace.

The whole idea of conciliation, admittedly monistic and often criticized because useful in seeking to avoid the outbreak of war but not to eradicate the causes of the grievances that lead to the brink, is of particular value today, especially when nuclear war may be involved. However, the Nobel Peace Prize which had been given to Roosevelt and Root was not awarded to "the first Christian pacifist in high office."<sup>93</sup> Nevertheless, Bryan considered his cooling-off treaties his most notable contribution to the nation, and it is fitting that he posed for his official portrait in the Department of State with a copy of one of them in his hand.

## NOTES

1. Oswald Garrison Villard, *Fighting Years* (New York, 1939), 191.
2. William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, *The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan* (Philadelphia, 1925), 384.
3. Proposals for submitting international disagreements to commissions of inquiry were offered as early as 1870, and such commissions had been used more than a hundred times in the nineteenth century. Merle E. Curti, "Bryan and World Peace," *Smith College Studies in History* (Northampton, Mass., 1931), 14; Denys P. Myers, *The Commission of Inquiry: The Wilson-Bryan Peace Plan* (Boston, 1913), 5.
4. Merle E. Curti, *Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936* (New York, 1936), 187.
5. Bryan, *Memoirs*, 385.
6. *Mr. Bryan's Peace Plan. Address by Hon. William J. Bryan at the Conference of the Interparliamentary Union at London, July 24, 1906* (Boston, 1913); John Dos Passos, *Mr. Wilson's War* (Garden City, N.Y., 1962), 85.
7. Bryan to Harry Walker, January 20, 1915, William Jennings Bryan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; W. J. Bryan, *The Fruits of the Tree. A Notable Address Delivered by Mr. Bryan at the World's Missionary Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland, June 17, 1910* (New York, 1910).
8. Oscar Straus, *Under Four Administrations* (Boston, 1922), 327; James Brown Scott (ed.), *The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907* (Washington, D.C., 1915).

9. Roosevelt to Senators John C. Spooner, January 6, 1905, Henry Cabot Lodge, January 6, 1905, and Shelby Cullom, January 10, 1905, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

10. James Brown Scott (ed.), *The Declaration of London* (New York, 1919).

11. W. J. Bryan, "The Arbitration Treaties," *The Outlook*, 98 (August 12, 1911), 801-812; "General Arbitration Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, August 3, 1911," *American Journal of International Law* (1911 Document Supplement), V, 255 [hereafter cited as *AJIL*]; W. H. Taft, *The United States and Peace* (New York, 1914); Bryan, *Memoirs*, 385.

12. Curti, *Peace or War*, 222-224.

13. Whitlock to Bryan, March 3, 1913, Allan Nevins (ed.), *The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock* (New York, 1936), I, 160.

14. "The Passing of Dollar Diplomacy," *AJIL*, 7 (April 1913), 339; "Mr. Bryan's Proposed Commissions of Inquiry," *ibid.*, 7 (July, 1913), 566-570.

15. "Memorandum by Mr. Bryan," with note addressed to Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

16. "Supplementary Memorandum by the Secretary of State," n.d., Bryan Papers.

17. Josephus Daniels Diary, Josephus Daniels Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Entry for April 8, 1913.

18. *Ibid.*, April 15, 1913.

19. W. J. Bryan, *The Commoner* (Lincoln, Neb., 1901-1923), May 2, 1913.

20. "Mr. Bryan's Statement in Presenting the President's Peace Plan . . . Thursday, April 24, 1912, noon," Bryan Papers; "Statement Made by the Secretary of State, on April 24, 1913." Department of State Papers.

21. *New York Times*, May 10, 1913.

22. Bryan to Wilson, May 26, 1913, William J. Bryan-Woodrow Wilson Correspondence, National Archives, Washington, D.C. The italics are mine.

23. Bryan to C. W. Bryan, June 5, 1913, Silas Bryan Papers. Bryan referred to California's anti-alien land law and the consequent displeasure of Japan. See the writer's "'The Most Thankless Task.': Bryan and the California Alien Land Legislation," *Pacific Historical Review*, 36 (May 1967), 163-187.

24. Bryan to C. W. Bryan, n.d., Silas Bryan Papers.

25. Bryan to Wilson, Bryan-Wilson Corr.; "Opposition to Arbitration Treaties," *The American Review of Reviews*, 48 (July 1913), 20.

26. W. H. Page to Wilson, December 21, 1913, Wilson Papers.

27. Spring Rice to Bryan, January 17, 1914, Bryan Papers.

28. Wilson to Bryan, January 19, 1914, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.

29. W. H. Page to Bryan, March 15, 17, 1914, Bryan Papers; Bryan to Gerard, July 5, 1914, Department of State Papers.

30. "Mr. Bryan's Proposed Commissions of Inquiry," *AJIL*, 7 (July 1913), 566-570; "The Bryan Peace Treaties," *Ibid.*, 7 (October 1913), 823-829; "Secretary Bryan's Peace Plan," *Ibid.*, 8 (July 1914), 565-571; "Peace and Public Policy," *American Review of Reviews*, 49 (January 1914), 3. The treaties were to run for five years, but in reality for six, for they remained in force for an additional twelve-months after one or the other party gave notice of intention to terminate. In the absence of such notice the treaties really became permanent.

31. Bryan to Wilson, July 14, 1914, Wilson Papers; *The Commoner*, (August 1914), 6-7.

32. Ray S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters*, 8 Vols. (Garden City, N.Y., 1927-1939), V, 16.

33. *New York Times*, August 14, 1914.

34. Wilson to Stone, September 21, 1914, Wilson Papers.

35. George Harvey, "All's Well with the Carabao," *The North American Review*, 199 (February 1914), 183-185; Arthur W. Dunn, *From Harrison to Harding: A Personal Narrative, Covering a Third of a Century, 1888-1921*, 2 Vols. (New York, 1922), II, 231-233; Dos Passos, *Mr. Wilson's War*, 81.

36. Quoted in *The Literary Digest*, 46 (May 31, 1913), 1207-1208.
37. "Fighting Strength as an Asset to Peace," *American Review of Reviews*, 49 (January 1914), 4.
38. *Literary Digest*, 47 (July 5, 1913), 8.
39. *The New Republic*, 3 (June 26, 1913), 187.
40. "The War Against War Still Goes On," *Current Opinion*, 54 (June 1914), 451.
41. *Literary Digest*, 47 (August 13, 1913), 273.
42. *New York Times*, February 8, 1915.
43. Letters of January 20, 1915, Henry Cabot Lodge, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918*, 2 Vols. (New York, 1925), II, 453.
44. *London Evening Standard*, *London Review*, *London Times*, quoted in *Literary Digest*, 47 (September 27, 1913), 515-516; "The Eternal Optimist," *London Spectator*, quoted in *Living Age*, 281 (May 2, 1914), 652.
45. "Bryan's Peace Proposals," *American Review of Reviews*, 47 (June 1913), 652.
46. Quoted in *Living Age*, 277 (June 14, 1913), 688-691.
47. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (New York, 1959), 222-232.
48. *The Commoner*, (September 1914), 7-9, 12; W. J. Bryan, "Our Foreign Policy," *The Independent*, 79 (October 9, 1913), 73-75; Curti, *Peace or War*, 162-163, 225.
49. See Willard H. Smith, "The Pacifist Thought of William Jennings Bryan," *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, 45 (January and April, 1971), 33-81, 152-181.
50. *The Commoner*, May 23, 1913.
51. *New York Times*, *New York World*, May 10, 1913; *The Commoner*, May 16, 1913; "A Peace Arbitration," *American Review of Reviews*, 47 (June 1913), 650-652.
52. "The Eternal Optimist," *Living Age*, 281 (May 2, 1914), 312-314.
53. Bryan to Wilson, August 1, 7, 1913, Wilson Papers; Bryan to Mrs. Bryan, August 7, 1913, Bryan Papers; *The Commoner*, August 1913. The texts of the treaties are printed in Document Supplement to Vol. X (1916) of *AJLL*.
54. Bryan to Spring Rice, August 14, 1914, U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement* (Washington, D.C., 1928), 5; Bryan to Jusserand, August 14, September 4, 1914, *ibid.*, 5-6 (hereafter cited as *Foreign Relations, Supplement*, with year).
55. See the writer's "William Jennings Bryan and the United States-Colombia Impasse," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 47 (November 1967), 486-501.
56. The acting secretary of state to the ambassador in Japan, October 16, 1914, *Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement*, ambassador to Japan to the secretary of state, November 4, 1914, *ibid.*, 11.
57. Bryan to Gerard, August 17, 1914, *ibid.*, 6.
58. Constantin Dumba, *Memoirs of a Diplomat*, translated from the German by I. F. D. Morrow (Boston, 1932), 228.
59. Bryan to Tumulty, September 27, 1914, Wilson Papers.
60. Bryan to Gerard, September 27, 1914, *Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement*, 8.
61. Bryan to Bernstorff, September 29, 1914, *ibid.*, 8-9.
62. Johann von Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America* (New York, 1920), 27.
63. James Gerard, *My First Eighty Years* (Garden City, N.Y., 1951), 187; Burton J. Hendrick, *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, 3 Vols. (Garden City, N.Y., 1924-1926), I, 294; Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom* (Princeton, 1956), 314-318; Charles Seymour (ed.), *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4 Vols. (Boston, 1926-1928), I, 235-275; Arthur D. Howden Smith, *Mr. House of Texas* (New York, 1940), 104-105.
64. Bryan to Gerard, July 15, 1914, *Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement*, 3-4; Gerard to Bryan, July 18, 1914, *ibid.*, 4, 6; Bernstorff, *My Three Years*, 68.
65. Bernstorff to Bryan, October 1, 1914, *Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement*, 9; "Memorandum of the Secretary of State, October 5, 1914," *ibid.*
66. Dumba to Bryan, October 9, 1914, *ibid.*, 10.

67. George F. Sparks (ed.), *A Many-Colored Toga: The Diary of Henry Fountain Ashurst* (Tucson, 1962), 35, entry of August 13, 1914.
68. Curti, *Peace or War*, 154.
69. *New York Times*, October 4, 1914; Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore, 1956), 447, 449; W. J. Bryan, "Roosevelt on the Peace Treaties," *The Commoner*, October 1914.
70. Copy of Bryan's Speech at the New York Prayer Day Exercises, Sunday, October 4, 1914, Wilson Papers.
71. Page to Wilson, June 8, 1913, Wilson Papers.
72. Spring Rice to Grey, March 16, 1914, Stephen Gwynn (ed.), *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, 2 Vols. (London, 1929), II, 206.
73. Page to Bryan, September 1, 1914, Bryan Papers.
74. Spring Rice to Grey, August 25, 1914, Gwynn (ed.) *Spring Rice*, II, 220.
75. Spring Rice to Bryan, October 26, 1914, Bryan Papers.
76. Editorial, *London Times*, September 28, 1914.
77. Spring Rice to Grey, April 30, 1915, September 15, 1916, Gwynn (ed.), *Spring Rice*, II, 264-265.
78. Bernstorff, *My Three Years*, p. 27; Dumba, *Memoirs*, 228-229. See also Seymour, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, I, 256n.
79. Bryan to T. W. Gregory, December 21, 1915, Gregory Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Andrew Carnegie to Bryan, January 13, 1915, Franklin K. Lane to Bryan, October 15, 1914, Bryan Papers; *New York Times*, October 14, 1914; *The Commoner*, November, 1914; William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy* (Boston, 1952), 65-66. Ironically enough, the personal seal which Bryan used for the peace treaties, which he believed emblematic of world peace, included the war god, Mars, seated on a throne with a scepter, and also a war eagle. Bryan had obtained the seal in Palestine, but its true character was not divined until Spring Rice had inquiries made at the British Museum.
80. Bryan to Harry Walker, January 20, 1915, Bryan Papers.
81. A. Schwan, "A Practical Peace Plan," *AJIL*, 8 (January 1914), 51-72.
82. Quoted in *Literary Digest*, 46 (May 31, 1913), 1208.
83. Joseph Choate, "The Right and Duty of Self-Defense," *North American Review*, 201 (March 1915), 363-365; Perry Belmont, "The First Line of National Defense," *ibid.*, 201 (June 1915), 883-889, and *An American Democrat: The Recollections of Perry Belmont* (New York, 1941), 529, 547, 556; Curti, "Bryan and World Peace," 155.
84. "The Effect of Mr. Bryan's Peace Treaties Upon the Relations of the United States with the Nations at War," *AJIL*, 9 (April, 1915), 494-496.
85. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed James Gerard to the British-American commission, Gerard accepted but indicated that it was "exactly equivalent to picking the flowers off a century plant; that nothing had happened for twenty-five years and probably nothing ever would happen." Gerard, *My First Eighty Years*, 298.
86. "The Resignation of Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State," *AJIL*, 9 (July 1915), 664-666.
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